The Weaponisation of More than Citizenship naturalization to the larger constituency of those residing in the oblasts/regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (7 million people).65 In other words, Russia first opened up rights to those residing in regions where Russia had stoked conflict, before expanding these rights to regions where Russia had not yet stoked conflict but would in 2022. In 2020, Russia expanded fast-track naturalization even further to all citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova.66 Jelena Džankić is right that Russia considers its actions of expansionary citizenship acquisition beyond its borders as lawful.67 However, Russia’s actions are not lawful in the eyes of states, like Ukraine, that forbid acquisition of dual citizenship. This legal contrast raises again the question of how we regulate, or not, citizenship when states disagree about lawfulness of citizenship acquisition across borders, in particular when they are viewed precisely as aggressive threats to sovereignty. Moreover, what do we do in cases of weaponised quasi-citizenship or ethnic claims? Such claims are less legally codified than citizenship and involve similar issues about consent – no one asks individuals of such weaponised claims if they accept or identify with them. As Jain concludes, Russia’s war against and invasion of Ukraine holds important consequences for the concept of citizenship. Citizenship can imply a “personal annexation”, with weaponisation of citizenship via passportisation a stark and alarming precursor to conflict.68 Whereas such weaponisation occurred as a consequence of annexation in Crimea, Russia has since weaponised citizenship again as a precursor to conflict, as it did in 2008 in Georgia. However, Russia is not only weaponising citizenship. It is weaponising what it means to be ethnically Russian and a Russian speaker where Russia can manufacture claims of oppression as pretext for intervention, even where such conflict means indiscriminately killing Ukrainian citizens, whether ethnic Ukrainians or ethnic Russians, speakers of Ukrainian or speakers of Russian.69 65 Zevelev I. (2021), ‘Russia in the Post-Soviet Space: Dual Citizenship as a Foreign Policy Instrument’, 2 Russia in Global Affairs. 66 Id. 67 Džankić J. (2022), ‘Regulation against weaponisation: a double-edged sword?’, GLOBALCIT, Weaponised Citizenship: Should international law restrict oppressive nationality attribution? - Page 2 of 12 - Globalcit (hereinafter ‘Džankić 2022’). 68 Peters 2010. 69 Knott E. (2023), ‘Existential Nationalism: Russia's War Against Ukraine’, Nations and Nationalism 29( 1), 45– 52. European University Institute 14