R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v SSHD fact that the adverse impact is to some extent ameliorated by the grant of leave to remain, tilts the balance.15 Counsel for the SSHD invited the Court to consider that evidence of exchanges in Parliamentary debates relating to registration fees showed the procedural duty under BCIA 2009 s 55 had been satisfied, notwithstanding the absence of other evidence of relevant consideration by the SSHD.16 The Court, while accepting that the exchanges did ‘add to the evidential picture’,17 did not accept that they changed the conclusion reached, which was that the SSHD had violated the BCIA 2009 s 55 procedural duty by failing to give adequate consideration, in relation to registration of children as British citizens, to the best interests of affected children. The Regulations setting out the fee were therefore unlawful and the Court deemed it ‘unnecessary to go further. Whether a [BCIA 2009] section 55 compliant decision-making process could properly alight on a fee of £1,012 is beyond the proper ambit of this judgment.’18 Eventually, the SSHD appealed to the Court of Appeal and the claimants cross-appealed. The SSHD’s appeal focused on the High Court’s treatment of the evidence before it as regards whether she had complied with the BCIA 2009 s 55 duty. This was, however, rejected. The claimants’ cross-appeal was premised on the High Court’s decision to reject their application concerning the construction of the statutory scheme. That appeal also failed, with the Court of Appeal holding that the decision below was correct on the basis that this ground was bound to fail in light of the earlier decision in R (Williams). In its view, this was not displaced by subsequent decisions; in particular, R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) [2017] UKSC 51; [2020] AC 869.19 Permission to appeal was, however, granted by the Supreme Court. The SSHD did not appeal. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT In the Supreme Court, the claimants’ appeal focused inevitably upon challenge to the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Williams) and the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal applying R (Williams). That appeal failed on the basis that Parliament had authorised, in primary legislation, the imposition of the relevant fee via subordinate legislation.20 The question of the appropriateness of the fee was held to be a political matter.21 The Supreme Court held that, where it was claimed that a later statute empowered the Executive to make subordinate legislation impinging upon or removing rights conferred by an earlier statute — in this case, the right to apply for registration as a British citizen — the question for the reviewing court was to interpret the later statute to ascertain the scope of the enabling power. The presumption is, however, that the later statute did not empower the Executive to make subordinate legislation that had the effect of removing rights conferred by 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 PRCBC HC (n 5) [112]. ibid [113]. ibid [115]. ibid [116]. PRCBC CA (n 5) [34]–[67] per Richards LJ. The Court of Appeal is, in general, bound as a matter of precedent by its own decisions. ibid [27]. ibid [53]. 305