The Meaning of ‘Life’ under the Indian Constitution nationality as the right to have rights. 32 Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACHR’) holds the view that nationality ‘allows the individual to acquire and exercise rights and obligations inherent in membership in a political community’ and that it is required to exercise specific rights. 33 Secondly, the Arendtian conception of the right to have rights indicates that a person without nationality is without human dignity. Christoph Menke articulates that what Arendt means is a loss of dignity apart from the loss of all human rights, the membership in a polity and the right to have rights. 34 John Douglas Macready notes that the right to have rights confers human dignity. 35 So, the deprivation of nationality, considered ‘more primitive than torture,’ affects human dignity. 36 The IACHR has recognised nationality as a ‘prerequisite for recognition of juridical personality’ and noted that non-recognition of juridical personality affects dignity. 37 Similarly, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights recognised the link between the right to nationality and dignity when it noted that a claim to nationality status is protected under art 5 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which guarantees the right to the respect of human dignity and recognition of legal status. 38 From the above, the right to have rights or the right to nationality can be understood as the right to membership in a polity and as ensuring the human dignity of a person. Somehow, nationality gives context to a human being and ensures the recognition of the human rights that should be accorded to a person. This is not to deny a state’s responsibility to accord human rights to everyone within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. 39 Rather, this describes the nature of the right to nationality as a fundamental right under international law, the removal or denial of which is to remove a right that is core to a person’s existence. 40 Accordingly, states have an international obligation not to render persons stateless and without such membership and dignity. 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 See UN Doc A/HRC/RES/32/5 (n 16). See also UN Doc A/HRC/RES/7/10 (n 16); UN Doc A/HRC/RES/10/13 (n 16); UN Doc A/HRC/RES/13/2 (n 16); UN Doc A/HRC/RES/20/4 (n 16); UN Doc A/HRC/RES/20/5 (n 16); UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/14 (n 16); CERD GR 30 (n 18) [3]; CCPR GC 17 (n 18) [8]. Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico (n 17) [137]. See also Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v Dominican Republic (Judgment) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No 282, 28 August 2014) [264]. Chistoph Menke, ‘Dignity as the Right to Have Rights: Human Dignity in Hannah Arendt’ in Marcus Düwell et al (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2014) 338. John Douglas Macready, Hannah Arendt and the Fragility of Human Dignity (Lexington Books 2017) 94. See Sangita Jaghai and Laura van Waas, ‘Stripped of Citizenship, Stripped of Dignity? A Critical Exploration of Nationality Deprivation as a Counter-Terrorism Measure’ in Christophe Paulussen and Martin Scheinin (eds), Human Dignity and Human Security in Times of Terrorism (Springer Nature 2019) 153, 163, citing Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (United States Supreme Court, 1958). Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico (n 17) [178]–[179]. The Nubian Community in Kenya v The Republic of Kenya (Communication) (The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 317/2006 19–28 February 2015) [136]–[140]. UN Doc A/HRC/RES/32/5 (n 16). ibid. 191