2. Institutionalised Arbitrariness mechanisms. Their decisions are styled as “opinions,” they lack statutory procedural codes, and their members do not enjoy independence and are under executive control. There is no legislative scheme that replicates the essential functions of civil courts, nor one that provides an adequate remedy for the rights at stake. As such, the claim that civil court jurisdiction has been ousted—explicitly or implicitly—is unsustainable under Indian law. 42 The missing legal foundations of the FTs are further established by the FT Order not meeting the domestic standards of legality. This is underscored by the Supreme Court’s ruling in A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More.74 In that case, the Supreme Court struck down an attempt by the Maharashtra State Government to convert an advisory grievance redressal committee into a quasijudicial tribunal through executive fiat. The committee, intended to handle disputes arising from the Shikshan Sevak Scheme, was declared ultra vires because it lacked a statutory foundation. The Court held that tribunals exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power must be created by legislation, and that their establishment cannot be left to executive discretion. It further asserted that “creation, continuance or existence of a judicial authority in a democracy must not depend on the discretion of the executive but should be governed and regulated by appropriate law enacted by a legislature.”75 The Court warned that allowing tribunals to be created by executive order alone, without statutory backing, could result in tribunals without clear regulations governing their constitution, functions, powers, appeals, and enforceability of orders—leading to “chaos and confusion.”76 Crucially, it ruled that neither high courts nor governments can, through judicial orders or administrative notifications, confer exclusive jurisdiction on such bodies. The Supreme Court, thus, stressed that tribunals must be backed by a clear legal regime specifying their constitution, powers, procedures, and the enforceability of their decisions. Without this framework, such bodies cannot enjoy the independence necessary for judicial functions. The Court warned that allowing tribunals to emerge from executive orders alone would lead to “chaos and confusion.” 77 These constitutional principles were plainly disregarded in Bahaluddin Sheikh, where the Gauhati High Court effectively converted the FTs into exclusive judicial forums without requiring any legislative mandate. In doing so, it bypassed the fundamental requirement that quasi-judicial bodies derive their legitimacy from statute, not administrative convenience or judicial assumption. Given that FTs have been created through an executive order, they clearly do not satisfy the requirement of being established by legislation. In summary, the Foreigners Tribunals’ origins in an executive order, their structural design as administrative bodies, and the absence of any enabling legislation undermine their claim to be “tribunals established by law.” The post-Sonowal jurisprudence, particularly Bahaluddin Sheikh, 74 75 76 (2011) 13 SCC 99. ibid [24]. ibid [27].