4. Violations of Natural Justice and the Right of Due Process Requiring testimony from issuing authorities imposes serious practical burdens. Gaon Panchayat Secretaries or Gaonburahs—the typical issuing authorities—are senior officials, and litigants, often poor and marginalised, have little power to compel their appearance. Even where willing, logistical barriers—such as travel costs and time away from official duties—make their attendance difficult. Lawyers report that defendants are frequently expected to bear these costs themselves, an inequitable and prohibitive demand. This rigid approach also fails to account for situations where the issuing authority is not the document’s true author. In one case, a Gaon Panchayat Secretary testified that his office assistant had prepared the certificate and he had merely signed it.367 The FT nonetheless rejected the certificate because the Secretary lacked personal knowledge of its contents, and the High Court declined to permit the summoning of the assistant—the actual author. This illustrates the narrow evidentiary view that excludes more just and flexible avenues for proving genuineness. The insistence on corroboration by contemporaneous records—such as registers or counterfoils— finds no basis in law. The Indian Evidence Act accepts the testimony of the document’s maker as sufficient proof. Demanding corroboration from records prepared under the same official’s authority creates circular logic that undermines even direct testimony. Moreover, confusion surrounds the term “register”: Panchayats are not required to maintain formal registers containing the contents mentioned in the certificate, though many keep counterfoils as informal records of issuing certificates. Certificates are also rejected for failing to meet undefined “prescribed formats”—for example, the absence of a memo number—even when issuing authorities explain these as clerical errors.368 116 The High Court often disregards substantive evidence in favour of such technicalities, penalising defendants for minor omissions. The rejection of certificates often has gendered implications, particularly for women who migrate to new villages upon marriage. Courts have applied inconsistent reasoning to certificates issued by officials in a litigant’s native or marital village. For example, certificates from a litigant’s native village have been dismissed on the grounds that only officials in the marital village could attest to the litigant’s identity.369 Conversely, certificates from the marital village have been rejected because officials there could not have witnessed the litigant’s birth or early life.370 This contradictory logic leaves women in a precarious position, with their certificates subject to arbitrary and unpredictable scrutiny. 367 Joynab Bibi v. Union of India WP(C) 6605/2016 (Gauhati High Court, 27 March 2018). Joyful Bibi v. Union of India WP(C) 2880/2016 (Gauhati High Court, 11 January 2017). Alaluddin v. Union of India WP(C) 5197/2016 (Gauhati High Court, 20 March 2018). 370 Borhan Ali (n 340). 368 369