2. Institutionalised Arbitrariness The Special Rapporteur has similarly underscored that removals must respect due process, ensuring equality before the law and adherence to principles of fairness and impartiality.125 Dismissals should only occur on serious grounds such as misconduct or incapacity, and adjudicators must have access to judicial protection when contesting removal.126 To meet these standards, the FTs would require robust safeguards against executive interference, clear guarantees of tenure, and the creation of an independent body to oversee appointments, performance assessments, and terminations. In the absence of these, their institutional design fails the test of judicial independence under both Indian constitutional law and international human rights law. But as of today, FTs are not independent institutions since there is executive interference in various facets like security of tenure, procedure for renewal, and removal process. FT members are frequently appointed on short-term, renewable contracts. Their performance reviews and tenure extensions are overseen by executive authorities—placing their continued appointment at the mercy of the state. This institutional design vitiates the independence of the FTs. 125 126 HRC ‘Safeguarding the independence of judicial systems in the face of contemporary challenges to democracy’ (21 June 2024) UN Doc A/ HRC/56/62, para 41, 71(a), 71(b), 71(c), 71(d). HRC ‘General Comment No. 32’ (n 47); HRC ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Belarus’ (19 November 1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.86, para 13; HRC ‘Mikhail Ivanovich Pastukhov v. Belarus’ (5 August 2003) UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/814/1998, para 7.3; HRC ‘Paul Perterer v. Austria’ (20 July 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001, para 9.4; HRC ‘Bandaranayake v. Sri Lanka’ (24 July 2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/93/D/1376/2005, para 6.5. 51