2. Institutionalised Arbitrariness Parliament.”50 The European Commission of Human Rights (ECtHR) has affirmed a similar view, underscoring that the legislative origin of such bodies is essential for ensuring their legitimacy.51 Further elaborating this principle, the UN Human Rights Committee has identified three essential features a norm must possess to qualify as “law”: it must be (i) publicly accessible, (ii) sufficiently precise to allow individuals to regulate their conduct and to guide those enforcing it, and (iii) not confer unfettered discretion on the state.52 These attributes ensure that “law” is not deployed as an instrument of executive will but remains a check on arbitrary power. Another core dimension of the “established by law” requirement is its function as a check against the creation of ad hoc or exceptional tribunals. States are generally discouraged from establishing parallel structures outside the ordinary judicial system, especially when existing courts are capable of hearing the matters in question. Where special tribunals are established, they must be justified by objective and reasonable grounds.53 As Clooney and Webb note, citing the Human Rights Committee, such bodies must not serve to displace the jurisdiction of ordinary courts arbitrarily.54 They cite the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to caution against the use of special tribunals that do not follow established legal procedures, underscoring the risk of politically motivated or selective justice. The global consensus across international human rights instruments affirms that the requirement that tribunals be “established by law” is essential to safeguarding judicial integrity and the rule of law. Especially in citizenship determinations—where individual rights and state power collide— adjudicatory bodies must not be created at the whim of the executive. They must be firmly grounded in law, meaningfully independent, and institutionally capable of delivering impartial and procedurally fair decisions. 50 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka “Dule” (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) 35 ILM 32 (1996) [43]. Zand v. Austria (ECommHR App 7360/76) (1977) 8 DR 167 [80]; Crociani, Palmiotti, Tanassai, Lefebvre D’Ovidio v. Italy (ECommHR App 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79, 8729/79) (1980) 22 DR 192 [219]. 52 HRC ‘General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34, para 25; HRC ‘General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21)’ (17 September 2020) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37, para 44; HRC ‘General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (The right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence, and protection of honour and reputation)’ (8 April 1988) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol 1) 181, paras 3, 8; HRC ‘Kirill Nepomnyashchiy v. Russian Federation’ (23 August 2018) UN Doc CCPR/C/123/D/2318/2013, para 7.7. 53 HRC ‘General Comment No. 32 (n 47); Clooney and Webb (n 49) 133. 54 Apitz Barbera et al. (First Court of Administrative Disputes) v. Venezuela, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 52 (30 May 1999) [129]. 51 39