368           Fisher Finally, a substantial literature theorizes the role of discretion in U.S. administrative and immigration law16 and analyzes its application in practice.17 This Article builds on each of these strands to analyze the potential of executive, rather than legislative, action to improve the situation of stateless people in the United States. This Article contains four Parts and a Conclusion. Part I describes the international law of statelessness, the human rights challenges that stateless people in the United States often face, the minimal legal protections afforded to stateless people in the United States, and the reasons that the U.S. government should take executive action to address statelessness. Part II outlines the considerable role of discretion in U.S. immigration adjudications. Many immigration benefits require a noncitizen to show that they meet eligibility requirements and that the noncitizen merits a favorable exercise of discretion.18 Government agencies also exercise prosecutorial discretion in civil immigration enforcement when they grant temporary reprieves, such as deferred action and parole, from immigration enforcement.19 Part III presents the Article’s proposal. After addressing preliminary considerations in identifying stateless individuals, it argues that adjudicators should consider statelessness as a positive factor in discretionary analysis for immigration benefits and in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Part IV evaluates the potential of this proposal to address the challenges that stateless people face. It concludes that considering statelessness as a discretionary factor in immigration adjudications and enforcement would address some of the humanitarian challenges that stateless individuals in the United States face. Ultimately, 16 17 18 19 (2013). Several works provide constitutional and legal theories of the role of discretion in administrative and immigration law. See generally Kanstroom, supra note 9; Hiroshi Motomura, The President’s Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 36 Immigr. & Nat’y L. Rev. 143, 166 (2015) [hereinafter Motomura, President’s Dilemma]; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 Yale L.J. 104 (2015). Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in Immigration Cases, 72 Admin. L. Rev. 367 (2020) [hereinafter Wadhia, Darkside Discretion]; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization and Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases, 6 Colum. J. Race & L. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Wadia, Demystifying Employment]; Nicole Hallett, Rethinking Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Enforcement, 42 Cardozo L. Rev. 1765 (2021); Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 36 Immigr. & Nat’y L. Rev. 1259, 1265–75 (2015). See infra Part II.A., pp. 17–18. See infra Part II.C.