324 R. Vecellio Segate “prosocial behavior” – which may easily turn into subservience and obedience and foster chilling effects on decentralised traditions and belonging. Furthermore, tracking for the purpose of assessing one’s “good character” should be disallowed, and potentially replaced with “group credentials” (as e.g. confirmed or disproved by diasporas) as pledged by the introducer. Too many States still deploy “good character” arguments to decide against naturalising stateless individuals (Mrekajova 2012, 35–36), often based on criminal precedents of dubious momentousness, fairness, and relevance, whose record might be even oral only and/or referred to several decades earlier. In fact, good-character tracking may dissuade stateless individuals from seeking official recognition and identity onboarding. Statelessness is also originated when a State creates a legal basis for factual denationalisation that denies the repatriation of citizens for alleged “terrorist” (or most often, terrorismsupportive broadly defined) activities abroad (Tripković 2023). As all “borderline citizens” – and especially stateless persons – are particularly vulnerable psychologically and exposed to the risk of psychiatric traumas and poor mental-health conditions (Herberholz 2022), the introducer may also be valuable in assisting all those who appear confused or inconsistent in retracing their roots or self-identifying (individually or community-wise). For the time being, the introducer role should be dissected into the entire spectrum of its policy, economic, and sociolegal implications, standing clear of hyperenthusiastic conclusions. Issues of trust, corruption, and traceability abound, and nowhere in the world an introducer-based system has ever been tested successfully on a large scale (Belorgey and Jaffrelot 2021, 17–18; Sathe 2014, 100–101). Even in India, where introducer-based enrollment was enacted to cater for the nonuniversality of citizen identification (Pengiran 2012, 228), Aadhaar’s data reports that only the 0.3 % of subscribers availed themselves of the “introducer” route: all others simply joined the scheme to “update” or “duplicate” paper-based identity credentials they already possessed (Access Now 2018, 14–15; Privacy International 2017, 22). This is all the more evident if one considers that Aadhaar provides no citizenship certificate: it is merely an identity matcher which does not alter the legal status of the onboardee (Nilekani 2013) – which is thus going to be proven with paper documents, still. To say it all, Rao (2019, 18) hypothesised that precisely because of the relatively low trustworthiness of introducer-based enrollment, Indian authorities decided to forego the linking of Aadhaar onboarding with new proofs of status. Regrettably, despite this policy backtracking, relevant fractions of Indian rural society enrolled into Aadhaar upon convincement that it would have been helpful and indeed legally required for them to secure proof of citizenship status for their children (Bhatia, Donger, and Bhabha 2021).