344 R. Vecellio Segate specific clause is inserted to regulate borderline situations vis-à-vis the introducer itself. To start filling this gap, the reader is invited to consider the specific scenarios and complexities I have tried to single out above, for each category of individuals at “borderline citizenship” situations. All such scenarios, however, shall be problematised against evidence that ‘biopolitical technologies, such as biometrics, highlight, and heighten, the tension between care and surveillance’ (Iazzolino 2021, 112), which is of special relevance precisely to asylum seekers, stateless individuals, nomadic populations, and internally displaced people. The way we should account for mentioned tension is to make sure that when the introducer’s function is performed through biometric technologies, the latter are as user-centred and intrusionprotected as feasible. Otherwise, mistrust for introducers themselves (that is, for their role and profile) might couple with mistrust for the technologies they are equipped with to remotely onboard individuals. 8.3 In what Ways Should the Private Sector’s Overreach onto Standards’ Selection and Socialisation be Problematised? The OECD, the G20, and other organisations and policy fora have long been advocating for a “smart” and “interconnected” data sharing across governmental departments, in order to reduce costs, optimise efficiency, and enhance dataanalytics outputs (OECD 2015, 18–70; Wang 2018). One not-so-tacit implication is that whole-of-government approaches within governments will also foster data sharing across governments, i.e. internationally (e.g. Vecellio Segate 2022c, 201–351). The benefits of “whole-of-government” approaches to data handling are often touted as self-evident and legitimate, not least in preventing data breaches (Carlin 2016). Developmental studies, too (e.g. Effah and Owusu-Oware 2021), lament the inefficiency inherent to data duplications in biometric systems between sector and national layers of domestic data governance. Yet, critical studies have been evidencing how this beneficial effect should not necessarily be assumed as given (Calo and Citron 2021). To begin with, restraining and disapplying the whole-of-government management practice would serve its share towards preventing regulatory capture: one captured department might well co-opt private actors into benefitted from citizens’ data, but if the latter was departmentally siloed, the private capturer would need to negotiate access conditions with each single department – which would hopefully prove overly resource-draining and time-consuming. Moreover, each piece of data is released by individuals under the tacit assumption or express provision that it will serve the only purposes for which its release was consented to: pursuing “whole-of-government” approaches, especially in