THE RISK OF STATELESSNESS 92 2017 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. 19 determination. In response, it would be important to emphasize that the right to nationality is a universal human right, and the importance of deriving a nationality at birth has been emphasized in many of the major human rights conventions.290 Here, the binary nature of nationality and the standard that a child should receive protection if she is more likely than not stateless may resonate. Statistically, a standard more onerous than “more likely than not” would accept on its face that a person who is more likely stateless than legally protected by nationality could be ineligible for international protection, which is an unacceptable outcome under the international regime of protection for stateless persons. Ultimately, a wellreasoned “more likely than not” standard may well be viewed as giving adequate consideration to states’ legitimate interests in regulating nationality acquisition within their own borders, while extending appropriate protection for the human right to nationality. These examples highlight the potential for blowback in response to the doctrinal expansion in the recent decision of the Inter-American Court in Expelled Haitians and Dominicans. The error of the Inter-American Court was to extend statelessness protection after it had identified a generalized risk of statelessness, but before it had decided whether that risk was sufficient to support a finding that the presumed victims were stateless persons. This Article urges a more cautious approach than that taken by the InterAmerican Court, but it should not be read to undermine the importance of the risk assessment suggested by the Court. Rather, this Article provides a framework for the Court and other international authorities to specifically assess the risk of statelessness as a means of determining whether a person is stateless. Ultimately, international law guarantees statelessness protection only to those who have been deemed stateless persons, but it should qualify as such those persons who are more likely than not stateless. CONCLUSION The international law of statelessness and human rights requires states to grant nationality to stateless children born in their territory. As the global effort to combat statelessness has gained momentum in the last decade, more states have demonstrated a willingness to extend this protection to stateless children. However, the historic resistance of states to international regulation of nationality law makes it unlikely that they will adopt a rule that would require them to grant nationality to a child born in their territory because of an unquantified risk of statelessness. In applying this ambiguous rule in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians, the Inter-American Court has potentially distorted an important human rights norm and risked undermining the effectiveness of the regional system in its effort to combat statelessness. The Court should endeavor to hew its jurisprudence on statelessness more carefully to the well-established international law rules extending 290. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing the ICCPR and the CRC). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111529