The Constitutional Citizen in Narratives participation, equal opportunities and integration of all people’. 22 These demands are based on different conceptions of a German ‘people’, 23 the former referring to an ethnocultural community and the latter including all human beings in Germany. Notably, neither conception overlaps with the formal German citizenry and neither demand would directly change the citizenship status of any individual. With their (so far unsuccessful) contributions to constitutional identity discourse, both groups instead aim to enshrine opposing versions of a ‘happy ending’ to their respective German narratives of peoplehood: the maintenance of a supposed coherent cultural identity and the equal participation of all residents in society. In terms of changing constitutional citizenship, though, they work similarly. The suggested amendments would have implications for the meaning of membership in a ‘German people’ without directly addressing citizenship regimes. Shaw’s notion of constitutional citizenship opens up a new and productive way to capture and analyse this relation. THE CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP But as every concept, constitutional citizenship, too, has its limits. Shaw clearly points this out regarding the demarcation between constitutional citizenship and citizenship more broadly — as she emphasises, constitutional citizenship ‘misses much that can be said about the “street-level” aspects of the regulation of citizenship’. 24 The demarcation between constitutional citizenship and constitutionalism more broadly, however, remains somewhat less clear — at least to a social scientist. What is it about constitutionalism, if anything, that lies beyond the analytical scope of constitutional citizenship? The answer could maybe refer to developments within constitutional discourse that, in contrast to the examples given above, do not have clear implications for ‘aspects of the membership relation that go to the very heart of a polity’ 25 within a certain context. But what might these be? Take for instance the several typical ‘“populist moves” on constitutional citizenship’ that Shaw identifies. 26 Most of them directly relate to the governance of citizenship status and citizenship rights. They include, for example, the stripping of the status, or the unequal distribution, of social and welfare rights, which have a clear bearing on membership. One of these moves also refers to structural attacks on the institutions guaranteeing the rule of law itself. 27 While it often comes hand-in-hand with other developments — considered 22 23 24 25 26 27 Johannes Eichenhofer and Farhad Dilmaghani, Mehr Integration und Teilhabe. Zwei Vorschläge für Rechtliche Neuregelungen (Report, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Forum Berlin 2017) <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/dialog/13302.pdf>; Anti-Rassismus Agenda 2025 — Für eine Rassismusfreie und Chancengerechte Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Maßnahmenkatalog des Begleitausschusses der BKMO (Agenda, Bundeskonferenz der Migrantenorganisationen 31 August 2020) 25 <https://bundeskonferenz-mo.de/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/200831_Antirassismus-Agenda-2025_BKMO.pdf>; Impulspapier Der Migrant*innenorganisationen Zur Teilhabe in Der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Wie Interkulturelle Öffnung Jetzt Gelingen Kann! (Report, Migrant*innenorganisationen 2016) 9. Shaw (n 1) 26–28. See also Kriszta Kovács’ contribution to this symposium: Kriszta Kovács, People, Sovereignty And Citizenship: The Ethnonational Populists’ Constitutional Vocabulary’ (2020) 2(2) Statelessness & Citizenship Review 389. Shaw (n 1) 44. ibid 57. ibid 190. ibid 190–91. See also Kovács (n 23). 375