Rohingya refugees had not participated or been consulted in the design or use of the ID scheme, and again raised objections about the lack of transparency and consultation.89 Many were initially concerned that the data may be passed to Myanmar raising safety concerns; or that the cards, if tied to aid delivery, could be used to enforce future repatriations just as the withholding of food aid to refugees had been used in the past. Rohingya community groups in the camps further objected to the way in which their biographic data was recorded – specifically to the absence of the terms “refugee” and “Rohingya” on the IDs.90 Both these issues also related to safety and protection concerns, as well as worries that their identity as a group belonging to Myanmar maybe undermined. The term “refugee” was understood to both bring protection from refoulement and to identify their origins in Myanmar in the absence of documentation issued by the Myanmar state. The term Rohingya, within the context of the erasure of their group identity in Myanmar, identified them as an ethnic group belonging to the Rakhine region of Myanmar. The absence of the term Rohingya was associated with the deliberate production and imposition of statelessness.91 Within the context of these insecurities, scuffles and beatings reportedly took place close to the UNHCR office, and rumours circulated that bribes were being offered to refugees who agreed to enrol in the ID card programme.92 Rohingya organisations in the camps launched a strike action to highlight their concerns about the smart cards.93 RRRC and UNHCR improved their approach in disseminating information to the refugee community groups. Following this, the strikes were cancelled, and registration proceeded more smoothly. The use of such identification technologies, when utilised responsibly can be effective in improving the lives of vulnerable and hard to reach communities. There is growing awareness within the humanitarian and international development sectors that in the absence of effective regulation, approaches to digital identification systems should incorporate key human rights and sustainable development principles in their design and architecture. Such approaches seek to ensure the meaningful participation of beneficiaries and balance unequal power relations. Larry Dohrs, writing for the ‘Good ID’ project, for example recommends designers of identification systems engage in privacy protections “in every step of process”; ensure that individuals have control over which data can be shared; enable individuals to decline participation without losing access to services and benefits; take power relations into account, including by giving preference to the individual end-user over large organisations; and ensure data collection and use is limited to a specific purpose to prevent function creep (e.g. limited to aid delivery and not used to implement repatriations).94 Following the resistance to issuing smart cards to Rohingya refugees, recommendations have been made to improve the informed consent process for the collection of biometric information in refugee settings. It has been noted that illiteracy, education levels and trauma should be taken into account before collecting biometric data.95 There are specific concerns regarding the extraction of biometric data for refugees and genocide survivors, which need to be taken into account in the design of informed consent processes. As Rohingya activist, Jaivet Ealom, explains: “ Rohingya are institutionalised not to question authorities and people in uniform. This concept has been reinforced by the Burmese regime with harsh punishment if anyone ever questioned documentation processes. For many of them, the only prior experience of fingerprint collections for any sort of documentation is by the Myanmar security forces. Thus, they are inclined to give them away without questioning even when they wouldn’t agree. In the worst-case scenario, this process could re-surface traumas back from Myanmar. In this regard, the following observation in the report of the Special Rapporteur on Racism is pertinent: Radio Free Asia, ‘Rohingya refugees protest, strike against smart ID cards issued in Bangladesh camps’ (November 2018) available at: https://www.refworld.org/ docid/5c2cc3b011.html [accessed 04/11/2020] 90 E. Prasse-Freeman, ‘Data Subjectivity in What State?’ (2020) available at: https://harvardilj.org/2020/03/data-subjectivity-in-what-state/ [accessed 11/11/2020] 91 Findings from field work conducted by Natalie Brinham between November 2017 and October 2018 in Bangladesh. This research was conducted as part of a PhD research project and was funded by Queen Mary University of London and the Economic and Social Research Council, UK. 92 J. Carroll, ‘Violence stalks UN’s identity card scheme in Rohingya camps’, Al Jazeera (November 2018) available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/23/ violence-stalks-uns-identity-card-scheme-in-rohingya-camps [accessed 11/11/2020] 93 Strike notice on file with ISI. 94 L. Dohrs, ‘It’s High Time to Distinguish Between Biometric Systems and Technologies’, Good ID (September 2019) available at: https://www.good-id.org/en/articles/ its-high-time-to-distinguish-between-biometric-systems-and-technologies/ [accessed 11/11/2020] 95 The Engine Room, ‘Understanding the Lived Effects of Digital ID: A Multi-Country Study’, (2020) available at: https://digitalid.theengineroom.org/assets/ pdfs/200123_FINAL_TER_Digital_ID_Report+Annexes_English_Interactive.pdf [accessed 13/11/2020] 89 18