On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness,… 311 between persons and the state of which they are citizens,41 where the notion of ‘genuine connection’ is best glossed in terms of Bauböck’s ‘citizen stakeholder’ view which proposes that those and only those individuals have a claim to membership of a polity whose individual autonomy and wellbeing is linked to the collective selfgovernment and flourishing of that polity.42 On this view, we should see particular citizenship rules such as ius soli, ius sanguinis and ius domicilii as denoting different routes through which a genuine connection is presumptively established— through parental citizenship, through place of birth and through residence—and as subject to the general principle of ius nexi. As Bauböck and Paskalev note, such a normative conception of citizenship ‘needs to be interpreted broadly in a way that takes into account some basic and normatively justifiable features of this system’ such as ‘birthright attribution of citizenship, individual consent in naturalization and renunciation, the prevention of statelessness, and normative commitments to peaceful and friendly international relations’.43 If we return to Allerton’s 2015 Malaysian case, noted in the preceding section, of a 5 year old child who had lived his whole life in Malaysia with his Malaysian father, the boy’s Thai national mother having abandoned the family when he was 6 months old, then on this ‘ius nexi’ view of citizenship the child has a legitimate claim to Malaysian nationality and does so irrespective of whether he also has a legitimate claim to Thai nationality. The implications of such a ‘citizen stakeholder’ view for contexts of mass denaturalization are twofold. First, it holds that ‘individuals are subject to arbitrary political domination if they have genuine links to the political community’ but are ‘involuntarily excluded from citizenship’.44 This point applies to those who are prevented from acquiring citizenship such as the ethnic minorities in Kenya highlighted in the last section and people of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic such as Dilcea Yean as well as people who are deprived of citizenship as members of a social group such as those whose citizenship was removed through the 2013 Dominican Supreme Court ruling. Second, because statelessness is both a wrong and a harm, it provides sufficient reason to legitimate granting citizenship to individuals whose current autonomy and well-being, extending to basic rights, is vulnerable to the decisions of a state even if they do not already possess established ties to that state.45 If we turn to the issue of individual denaturalization, then the salience not only of protection of the fundamental interests of individuals but also the realization of the common good within states and the conditions of cooperation between states becomes salient. Current practices of individual citizenship deprivation in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ not only reproduce the arguments for, and the features that characterized, the practice of banishment from the 17th to the 19th century but are also subject to the criticisms that led to the abandonment of this practice, primary among them the complaint made by Voltaire that the banishment of criminals 41 Shachar (2009). Bauböck (2015). 43 Bauböck and Paskalev (2015), p. 67. 44 Bauböck and Paskalev (2015), p. 67. 45 Bauböck and Paskalev (2015), p. 68. 42 123