The ‘Genuine and Effective Link’ Parliament’s intent as discussed in Part II. Here, the Hansard’s relevance and its availability as an interpretative aid are crucial, given that the Constitution must be interpreted in its historical and philosophical context. 58 On the one hand, the principle conforms with Parliament’s view that citizenship should only be conferred upon those who have an ‘attachment to the country’. 59 On the other hand, it was explicitly set out that the jus soli principle was being supplemented with the jus sanguinis principle, the implication being that Parliament’s intention was to retain the two. 60 Adopting the Nottebohm principle as a supplementary element allows us to reconcile both these premises, and, further, does not upset post-Chin Kooi Nah caselaw recognising the jus soli/jus sanguinis requirements. A modified s 1(e) test incorporating the ‘genuine and effective link’ could thus be: 1. Article 14(1)(b) (jus soli): Was the applicant born in Malaysia? If yes, proceed to 2); if not, the applicant fails to satisfy the test. 2. Section 1(e) (jus sanguinis): Is the applicant entitled to the citizenship of another country through their lineage? If yes, proceed to 3); if not, the applicant is entitled to citizenship by operation of law. 3. Extended s 1(e) (genuine and effective link): Does the applicant have a genuine and effective link with Malaysia? This is a factual determination that considers the Nottebohm factors (habitual residence, centre of interests, family ties) but also whether the applicant, being entitled to foreign citizenship, has taken any steps towards acquiring it. Doing so would, I argue, suggest a lack of a genuine attachment to Malaysia, thus meaning the applicant fails to satisfy the test. Citizenship should therefore not be conferred upon them. Applying this modified test to the facts of Than and Lim offers insight as to how it would work in practice, and whether the outcomes generated would have been significantly different from under the existing s 1(e) test. To recall, in both cases the appellants were found to have satisfied the jus soli requirement but not the jus sanguinis one. In T’s case, this was because the identity and nationalities of his birth parents were unknown, making it impossible to determine his lineage. The assumption here was that T could have been, per s 1(e), ‘born a citizen of another country’, and that he had not proven otherwise on the balance of probabilities. Similarly, L did not satisfy this requirement because he had purportedly acquired the Thai citizenship of his birth mother. In both cases, the explicit/implied premise for failing the existing s 1(e) test was that the appellants were (potentially) entitled to the citizenship of another 58 59 60 Maria Chin Abdullah v Ketua Pengarah Imigresen [2021] 1 MLJ 750, [537]. DR Hansard 29 January 1962 (n 8). DR Hansard 31 January 1962 (n 6). 321