Trop v. Dulles “We believe . . . that use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment. There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is, instead, the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights and, presumably, as long as he remained in this country, he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so, because he is stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.” 164 “Torture” is defined, in part, as the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.165 Courts have adopted a range of interpretations of the term “acquiescence,” some of them requiring that a public official have awareness of or remain “willfully blind” to the activity constituting torture, prior to its commission, and thereafter breaches his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.166 Other courts require that the official have specific intent that the torture occur.167 There is no statutory time limit for filing a protection claim under CAT. In applying for CAT protection, a respondent bears the burden of proof.168 To meet this burden, the respondent must show that she, or someone in the same circumstances, is more likely than not to be tortured in the designated country of removal.169 In meeting this burden, the respondent must present, and the IJ must assess, evidence showing the possibility of future torture, including evidence of past torture; any gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal; and other relevant country of origin information.170 A pattern of human rights violations alone is not sufficient to show that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that State; specific grounds must exist to indicate that the respondent will be personally at risk of torture.171 She must also prove that she could not safely relocate to another area within the State where she fears torture. Practice Point For stateless people who have suffered severe social exclusion and the denial of access to basic civil, political, economic, and social rights because of their statelessness, but have not been the subject of direct physical violence or detention by government actors, it may be necessary to document and describe the experience of being without a nationality as akin to torture. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1957). 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 166 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). 167 See, e.g., Pierre v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 187-89 (3d Cir. 2008). 168 See generally Kamara v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 420 F. 3d 202, 212 (3d Cir. 2005); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F. 3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). 169 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see also Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. 291, 303-04 (BIA 2002); Matter of G-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 366, 371-72 (BIA 2002); Matter of M-B-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 478-79. 170 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). 171 Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306, 1313 (BIA 2000). 164 165 36