Zahra Albarazi exclusion of particular groups or persons from the nation-state, through the manipulation by states of its ‘citizenry’ is not a new phenomenon. Exclusion or inclusion based on a perceived lack of loyalty to the nation-state in support of a political agenda has been particularly rife in the MENA region since 2011. Both the stripping of citizenship from the disloyal, and the granting citizenship to secure loyalty have been frequently used measures. The situation in Bahrain highlights the former policy. In the spirit of the Arab spring, Bahrain witnessed protests over several months, with individuals and groups calling for reforms. The authorities cracked down hard on these protests using a range of oppressive means.33 One of the methods of oppression employed is that of denationalisation. Since the start of the protests, the authorities have revoked Bahraini citizenship of hundreds of individuals who had been a part of the rising opposition, including human rights activists, political opponents and religious leaders.34 With the ruling family from the minority Sunni population, these individuals were predominantly individuals from the Shia population and in many cases their denationalisation has left them stateless.35 This use of denationalisation spread to other countries in the Gulf, and the threat of removal of nationality has reduced the space for political opposition and silenced much dissent.36 On the other side of the spectrum, the situation in Syria shows how the offering of citizenship can be used in pursuit of a political agenda just as the revocation of citizenship. As discussed above in section 1.3, hundreds of thousands of Kurds were left stateless due to state policy in the 60s. In 2011, with protests beginning to spread across Syria, the government tried to appease protestors from the Kurdish region by offering citizenship to some of those who had been left stateless for decades. Although this only included a section of those stateless and there were fundamental flaws in implementation, it still shows how the government planned to use the offer of citizenship to encourage loyalty and quell disloyalty.37 Another consequence of these turmoils is the changing shape of territories and governance. Developments for which it is too early to understand their citizenship implications, have created many territorial areas in the region which are no longer under the control of the recognised state authorities. Examples of this include the non-state controlled areas of Libya, Syria and Iraq. This situation has led to serious documentation issues – individuals unable to access civil registries as these do not exist, confusion over which documents may be regarded as 33 See for example Human Rights Watch Country Report Bahrain, 2016, access at https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2017/country-chapters/bahrain 34 ibid 35 For more information on this please see the UPR submission of the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and Americans for Democracy and Human Rights on Bahrain, 2017, at https://www.uprinfo.org/sites/default/files/document/bahrain/session_27_-_may_2017/js10_upr27_bhr_e_main.pdf 36 See The Economist, To silence dissidents, Gulf states are revoking their citizenship, 2016, access at https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21710679-many-are-left-stateless-result-silencedissidents-gulf-states-are 37 See Mcgee, T, Statelessness Displaced: Update on Syria’s Stateless Kurds, ISI Working Paper Series, 2016, access at http://www.institutesi.org/WP2016_02.pdf and BBC News, Syria’s Assad grants nationality to Hasaka Kurds, 2011, access at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12995174 8 RSCAS/GLOBALCIT-Comp. 2017/3- © 2017 Author(s)