Constitutions, Citizenship and the Shadow of Statelessness conflict or post-transition. 15 Other provisions provide that the rights and freedoms of citizens are also available to stateless persons. Contrastingly, sometimes there are constitutional exclusions from rights protections for those who are stateless, including limits on political rights and the ability to own property. The fourth type of reference is to stateless persons being able to seek asylum or receive protection from expulsion or deportation alongside refugees and asylum seekers. Although it is surprising that constitutional references to citizenship are relatively light given the importance of ‘the people’ to the constitutional enterprise, the lack of explicit reference to stateless people is less unexpected. Almost by definition, stateless people are not ‘the people’ with whom a constitution is intimately connected; ‘the people in question’ are not those who are stateless. Equally, no state makes creating statelessness into a constitutional objective, although as Shaw notes, it can readily become the core by-product of ‘constitutional exclusivity’. 16 In this sense, the fact that over 30 constitutions refer to stateless persons, and many in an inclusionary rather than an exclusionary manner, seems promising. Having said that, the potential implications for stateless people in those states where the constitution is silent on their status are significant. Where the constitution is protective of those who are stateless, either by according citizenship or access to rights, then this provides a constitutional bulwark. If there is no constitutional reference to those who are stateless, then their plight is left to the whim of politicians, judges or bureaucrats of the day. As Shaw notes, even in those constitutions that make comprehensive reference to citizenship, much of the detail of citizenship regulation is often determined by the legislature. 17 In the current environment, the perils of a populist legislature are a particular risk, with tyranny of the majority a very real prospect. Equally, administrative, procedural and bureaucratic measures can have a profound negative impact and result in precarious outcomes for those who are stateless. While explicit constitutional reference to those who are stateless may therefore be useful, this can still be undermined on the ground by political, judicial, administrative and bureaucratic actions. As Julija Sardelić notes in her comment, the dynamic of constitutional citizenship can work to enhance equality and dignity of all human beings (including those who are stateless), but it can also undermine it. 18 DISCRIMINATION AND ITS IMPACTS The second observation prompted by Shaw’s book is the profound impact of discrimination — racial, religious and gender in particular — on both citizenship and statelessness. As Shaw points out, states have been manipulating citizenship in ‘the national interest’ for as long as it has existed as a constitutional phenomenon, with almost every instance of decolonisation involving an element of ‘engineering’ of citizenship, often based on problematic ‘ethnic’ choices. 19 15 16 17 18 19 Shaw (n 1) 146. ibid. ibid 40. Julija Sardelić, ‘Citizenship, Constitutions and Peoples on the Margins’ (2020) 2(2) Statelessness & Citizenship Review 384, 387. Shaw (n 1) 185. 379