22 Lucia M. Rafanelli justice of the state system as a whole can affect refugees’ obligations and how compliance with camp or host state authorities (even reasonably just ones) can perpetuate an unjust state system. For example, D’Cruz, Gates and Klosko, and Rescher all argue that refugees have obligations to obey their host states or camp authorities that can be cancelled if those states or authorities are exceptionally unjust.100 But all these thinkers seem to say we can assess refugees’ obligations by assessing their host state’s or camp’s justice in isolation.101 They do not consider how supporting even a relatively just state or statist camp authority can strengthen a state system that is unjust overall (especially toward refugees). While I have argued only for moral permissions—not moral obligations—on the part of stateless people themselves to resist statist institutions, I propose that others may be obligated to support stateless people when they exercise these moral permissions. After all, some more privileged people will be able to support stateless people’s resistance movements without facing the prohibitive costs stateless people themselves face. If the natural duty of justice (or some other principle) obligates people to pursue justice, and if resisting statist institutions is necessary to achieve justice for stateless people, those who can facilitate such resistance without absorbing unreasonable costs may be obligated to do so. One might object that resisting statist institutions is not actually necessary to achieve justice for stateless people, because they could instead be incorporated into statist institutions and statist institutions could grant them the various benefits, protections, and political representation they are currently denied. Call this the accommodationist objection. Even in the Hong Kong case, some of the remedies asylum seekers sought—like more transparency around the value of their food aid and swifter resolution of the claims they brought to the government—could have been provided by existing statist institutions, their actual reluctance to do so notwithstanding. Gibney seems to endorse the accommodationist objection, suggesting that the state system’s inevitable production of refugees threatens to delegitimise it unless states ‘incorporate refugees back into the system’.102 For Gibney, this re-incorporation may sometimes require states to grant refugees asylum, though perhaps not full citizenship.103 There are, however, two problems with this reasoning. First, without challenging at least one of the state system’s core organising principles (the Political Authority and Sovereignty Principles), any benefits statist institutions granted to stateless people would be granted, and therefore revocable, by state discretion. Left unchallenged, the Political Authority and Sovereignty Principles mean stateless people will always experience the state system (and the institutions that comprise it) as a dominating force that can give and take benefits at will.104 100 D’Cruz 2014; Gates and Klosko 2022; Rescher 1992. D’Cruz (2014, 2), Rescher (1992, 23–5), and Gates and Klosko (2022, 3) address the obligations of ‘refugees’, a category they define more narrowly than the category of ‘stateless persons’ as I understand it. Thus, their arguments are only meant to apply to a subset of those whose moral permissions I discuss. Still, my overarching point—that they only consider how the justice of individual states or camps can affect refugees’ obligations, ignoring how states and camps can reinforce injustice on the state-system level— stands. 102 Gibney 2018, 4. 103 Ibid., 4–5. 104 For this understanding of domination, I draw on Pettit 2011. 101 https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192500003X Published online by Cambridge University Press