The Grimshaw Review of International Affairs Vol. 2, No. 1 paternalistic “white saviour” narrative that often dominates humanitarian responses, instead advocating for frameworks – like justice and citizenship – that dismantle racialised hierarchies embedded in state practices (Aloudat and Khan 2022: 1). However, Myanmar’s contemporary authoritarian structure reveals a key shortcoming to postcolonialism: the theory’s limited capacity to account for how present-day regime incentives and elite strategies independently drive exclusion and repression. While the legacy of colonial state formation and ethnic categorisation remains vital (Clarke et al., 2019; Burke, 2016), the current patterns of violence – notably against the Rohingya – are perhaps better understood through the lens of elite incentive structures and institutional power dynamics. In this sense, selectorate theory offers a useful corrective. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p. 23) argue, leaders remain in power by choosing between two core strategies: they can offer broad-based public goods to the population at large, or allocate private goods to a narrow group of supporters. The latter strategy is far more attractive in systems governed by small winning coalitions, where loyalty, not popularity, determines political survival Myanmar’s military junta exemplifies this logic. Protected from electoral accountability and backed by a limited coalition composed of military elites and business cronies, the regime has little incentive to invest in minority rights, legal protections, or equitable access to services. It instead allocates “excludable and rival” private goods, including land rights and military patronage, in ways that reward loyalty and suppress dissent (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 29). This logic is starkly conveyed in the systematic repression of the Rohingya, who are denied access to such public goods. As Beiser-MacGrath and Metternich (2021, p. 151-153) illustrate, personalist autocrats often exclude large ethnic groups from ruling coalitions to avoid empowering potential challengers; in Myanmar, the Rohingya’s demographic concentration in the Rakhine State makes them especially threatening to the military’s monopoly on power. This logic is entrenched by Myanmar’s hybrid institutional architecture: the 2008 Constitution enshrined military prerogatives, including veto powers and control over key ministries, creating a façade of democratisation while safeguarding elite dominance (Stokke & Aung, 2019, p. 3; cited in Middleton & Win, 2021, p. 47). 14