Broadening the lens on citizenship revocation and the security of citizenship provisions suggest that a substantial population qualified as citizens at birth, and had previously been treated as citizens in various ways (and, furthermore, did not have any other citizenship). But the NRC assessment deemed Assam to be an exception to the universal Indian ius soli provision up to 1986, and recognised only those born before 1971 (though this is currently subject to court judgement). Both in Assam and Syria, where descent from a citizen was the criterion, the burden of proof was on citizens themselves to provide documentary evidence under constrained circumstances. It appears that the processes were applied differentially to different groups, and the inability to provide documentary evidence, or clerical errors, led to exclusion, or selective acceptance on ethnic and religious criteria. For the many who did not succeed in establishing citizenship the processes of appeal have been limited. In Myanmar, rather than a determination process, the basis for revocation lay in the redefined criteria for citizenship from 1982, which subsequently have been applied retroactively in a way that amounted to revoking citizenship. Retroactive withdrawal from those were previously ostensible citizens through automatic acquisition on the basis of birthplace or descent is better understood as a matter of revocation than denial. The outcomes of revocation: statelessness and the loss of rights In these cases the creation of statelessness has not constrained state action (though in some cases it has been suggested that those losing citizenship are the responsibility of another state with which they are historically linked). None of India, Myanmar or Syria have acceded to the 1961 Convention (with its constraints against rendering stateless, or revoking on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds). Nigeria in 2011 acceded to the Convention, though it has yet to implement its provisions with changes in domestic law. These revocations often have the effect of rendering citizens stateless. Even when they have not done so, those affected lose the security of citizenship in their country of residence. While revocation has been associated with deportation or exclusion for the Rohingya, for the Muslims of Assam, it has instead led to confinement in detention centres. In Syria, some Kurds have been subject to internal deportation; in each case loss of citizenship has meant limits on internal mobility as well as restrictions either on leaving or on re-entering the country, or both. The breadth and depth of the other rights that have been lost are particularly striking. Not only political rights (e.g. the right to vote), but a whole range of basic social (identity documents, education), and economic (land ownership, employment) rights, as well as cultural rights, have been denied or subject to substantial barriers compared with their exercise by those recognised as citizens. Conclusion These case studies demonstrate practices of revocation of citizenship in a new range of contexts. They raise a different range of concerns from the cases controversial in the West. To the extent that they apply criteria for citizenship retroactively, discriminate among citizens on ethnic or religious lines, and offer a limited framework for appeal, they display elements of arbitrary withdrawal. Such practices undermine the security central to the status of citizenship, whose loss is critical even when not associated with deportation, but with the loss of rights and exclusions from social, economic and cultural life. These examples highlight the way in which citizenship protects other rights, and provide strong evidence why it should be held securely. for in the case of most non-Muslims who entered before 2014. In Myanmar, these ‘national races’ were already mentioned in the Constitution from 1948, but were given priority in citizenship legislation only in 1982. European University Institute 3