Citizenship, Constitutions and Peoples on the Margins It is on the basis of Shaw’s powerful conceptual analysis that I can talk about the case of Slovenia — where (as in other European Union Member States) most Roma have limited access to drinking water — and draw parallels to how governments of settler-colonial states approach their indigenous citizens. Both cases cannot be fully understood without looking at the broader historical picture; Shaw argues for more of the empirical material analysed in her book: If words from constitutions are cited, then it should be remembered that these are precisely what they are: just words. Context is indeed everything, and both small changes and the bigger picture could be missed with such a static approach. 16 Indeed, taking the governments’ interpretations at face value — that giving certain rights to minorities would discriminate against the majority — ignores the broader context, both in the case of Roma in Europe and in the indigenous populations of settler-colonial states. It ignores past discriminatory legislation and policies that meant Roma were often not able or allowed to buy land, leading them to live in informal settlements. 17 It ignores that, in settler-colonial states, land has been historically stolen from indigenous peoples (taken based on the terra nullius principle) or that indigenous peoples were made to sign trading agreements that could very easily be nullified. And it is precisely without these contexts that we would not understand the dynamics in which constitutional citizenship operates. Without these contexts, it would be difficult to understand why the Slovenian Constitution, like the one of Poland that Shaw refers to, 18 mentions the Slovenian nation and its right to self-determination in the preamble and only later in the text talks about all citizens. Without the context in which constitutional legal documents were drafted or that in which they operate — even in cases where the state does not have a written constitution, such as the UK but also Aotearoa/New Zealand — we cannot fully comprehend how they constitute the foundation of citizenship. And that is where Shaw masterfully brings not only multi-layered specialities of citizenship, but also multi-layered histories; be it those of how colonialism or EU integration (and the backlash against it) shaped citizenship. They show how the dynamic of constitutional citizenship can enhance the equality and dignity of all human beings (in connection to human rights), but also undermine it. The two examples remained in my mind while reading Shaw’s discussion on how the notion of ‘the people’ is constituted in populist politics. 19 The allegedly ‘discriminated majority’ is evoked in populist politics. While this has been highlighted to a greater extent in recent years, Shaw rightfully shows how the populist definition of the people has much deeper roots. The reinterpretation of who the people are can lead, ultimately, to exclusions, as seen in the cases of the Rohingya in Myanmar, Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic 16 17 18 19 ibid 33. Julija Sardelić, The Fringes of Citizenship: Romani Minorities in Europe and Civic Marginalization (Manchester University Press 2021) . Shaw (n 1) 88, citing Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997, Dziennik Ustaw No 78, item 483 (Poland) preamble. For more on populism see Kriszta Kovács. ‘People, Sovereignty and Citizenship: The Ethnonational Populists’ Constitutional Vocabulary’ (2020) 2(2) Statelessness & Citizenship Review 389. ibid. 387