Besserer Rayas et al. Comparative Migration Studies (2024) 12:47 process newcomers in the criminal justice system (without identification documents, the Colombian legal system could not adequately process cases of suspected criminal activity) (Interview with public official B). Despite the many benefits that regularization through the PEP would bring to individuals and families, by 2019, only 720,000 of a total estimated 1.6 million people had obtained this form of documentation, or just 44% of the resident Venezuelan population (i.e., excluding those in transit) (MRE, 2020). One of the main obstacles, or paperwork gaps identified by state officials was the lack of valid passports resulting in irregular border crossings. The requirement of having entered the country through an official checkpoint excluded many Venezuelans who did not have a passport and/or those who used informal crossing points (trochas, as they are called on both the Colombian and Venezuelan sides of the border). As discussed above, since 2016, passports became extremely difficult to obtain in Venezuela. In response, in 2020, three years after the PEP had been introduced, the Colombian government introduced the Special Permit for Permanence and Incentivizing Formalization, or PEPFF. It was valid for a minimum of two months and maximum of two years, depending on the contract the individual had. Unlike the PEP, the PEPFF required an employment offer but accepted either a Venezuelan passport or the more common cédula (an identification card), regardless of their expiration date; furthermore, it did not require regular entry (MC, 2020). In 2021, President Duque signed a decree that created a more sustainable form of regularization, the PPT (or Temporary Residence Permit), providing Venezuelans with a 10-year residence and work permit and an ID card akin to a Colombian nationality identity document. The decree recognized three things: (a) there had been valuable changes to making requirements more flexible (flexibilización) via previous policies targeting Venezuelans but that more was needed in order to “facilitate the governance of migratory flows” from Venezuela; (b) that despite bureaucratic flexibility by the Colombian state, there was a persistent and growing proportion of irregular Venezuelan immigrants; and (c) that the Colombian state has an explicit objective of “promoting a migratory policy that is safe, orderly, and regular,” which required an increase in the number of regular migratory statuses (MRE, 2021a). The PPT provided regular migratory status for 10 years, granting legal residence and work, and could result in permanent residence and naturalization for all Venezuelans present in Colombia on January 31, 2021, regardless of having a valid passport or having entered irregularly.7 A high-ranking official who served as legal advisor to the president described this policy as “immigration amnesty” (Interview with public official C), while another saw it as a series of concessions made to Venezuelans by the Colombian state, “more rights, a plastic ID card,” in exchange for more information and control, such as providing biometrics (Interview with public official B). By mid-2023, official statistics reported that of approximately 2.87 million Venezuelans in Colombia, 1.89 million had been issued a PPT, while 416,000 were in the process, thus awaiting the card, and 500,000 remained undocumented due to new irregular entries (R4V, 2024). Thus, the PPT built an important bridge to close the paperwork gap for many passport-less Venezuelans. 7 Those who entered after January 31, 2021, required a valid passport and border stamp. Page 14 of 20