SAVICKIS AND OTHERS v. LATVIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS B. Whether the applicants are in a relevantly similar situation to that of Latvian citizens 10. Crucially, the majority confirm that “the applicants can be considered to be in a relevantly similar situation to persons with the same employment history but possessing Latvian citizenship” (see paragraph 195 of the present judgment, emphasis added). We agree. We note that the applicants, as permanently resident non-citizens, are in fact not only treated differently to citizens, but that with respect to the reckoning of periods of employment and equivalent periods accrued outside the territory of Latvia, they are equated with foreign nationals and stateless persons (see paragraph 3 above), notwithstanding their recognised and longstanding links with Latvia. By accepting, firstly, that non-citizens are similarly situated as regards their pension entitlement and, secondly, that the difference in treatment complained of is directly based on nationality, the majority confirm that this case is on all fours with Andrejeva, thus underlining the need for very solid reasons for overruling the latter. C. The legitimacy of the aims pursued 11. As indicated by the majority, the Government argue that the difference in treatment between citizens and permanently resident non-citizens pursued two aims: “safeguarding the constitutional identity of the State by implementing the doctrine of State continuity” and “protecting the economic system of the country” (see paragraph 196 of the present judgment). We will consider both aims in turn. V. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE CONTINUITY AND THE PROTECTION OF LATVIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 12. The application of the doctrine of State continuity means that the Republic of Latvia, established in 1918, continued to exist de jure under the illegal occupation by the Soviet Union and that it was the same State whose independence was restored in 1990 (see the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 17 February 2011, § 11.1, quoted in paragraph 53 of the present judgment). The doctrine implies that “the acts of the illegally established public authorities of the [occupying] State in the field of public law are not binding on the State which has restored its independence” (same judgment, § 11.3), and that “the restored State is not required to undertake any obligations emanating from the obligations of the occupying State” (ibid.). At this point, we would like to note that the issue raised by the present application does not concern the undertaking by Latvia of any of the obligations of the Soviet Union. As in Andrejeva, this case concerns a 81