SAVICKIS AND OTHERS v. LATVIA JUDGMENT the applicants’ complaints, declaring that the Andrejeva judgment did not warrant a reopening of their cases. On 5 March 2010 the applicants applied to the Constitutional Court, petitioning it to overrule and overturn its previous approach in relation to Paragraph 1 of the transitional provisions of the State Pensions Act (defined in 2001), and to make a new judgment on the basis of the Grand Chamber judgment in Andrejeva. The Constitutional Court delivered a judgment on the merits of the applicants’ arguments (including the circumstances of each individual case) on 17 February 2011. 136. In the Court’s view, the applicants’ requests for reopening of the administrative proceedings before the District Administrative Court and the subsequent individual complaint before the Constitutional Court must be regarded as a single set of proceedings, ultimately aimed at obtaining the recalculation of their pensions following the Court’s judgment in the Andrejeva case. It is true that the applicants remained passive for a long time after the initial calculation of their pensions. However, the Court accepts that they could have believed, realistically and in good faith, that their legal situation had changed after the delivery of the Andrejeva judgment, which they considered as giving them a fresh opportunity to obtain a recalculation of their pensions – either immediately, or, if need be, after a formal invalidation of the impugned legal provision by the Constitutional Court. This was especially so because, unlike the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 17 February 2011, the Andrejeva judgment expressly refused to attribute a decisive role to the distinction between working in the territory of Latvia or outside it (ibid., § 85). What this Court considers decisive is the fact that the Constitutional Court did indeed consider the applicants’ constitutional complaints to be procedurally admissible under domestic law, agreed to examine them on the merits, and gave a meticulously reasoned judgment addressing the same human-rights issues that the applicants are now bringing before this Court (see, mutatis mutandis, Schmidt, cited above, §§ 68-71). 137. In consequence, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 17 February 2011 was indeed the “final decision” for the purposes of Article 35 § 1, and that the six-month time-limit has to be counted from the date of its delivery. The present application, lodged with the Court on 4 August 2011, has therefore been submitted within the six months following the latter date. For this reason, the respondent Government’s objection must be dismissed. 4. Objections with respect to specific applicants (a) The second applicant (i) The parties’ arguments 138. The respondent Government argued that the second applicant’s reopening request, brought before the administrative courts, had only 48