The Transnational Human Rights Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1 view is not isolated but coincides with the perception in the rest of India. Although this suspicion was initially directed at all Bengali speaking population (Hindus and Muslims) who in the eyes of the Assamese led to an erosion of their own “cultural and linguistic identities”,106 the constant stream of refugees from Bangladesh gave the impression that most of such immigrants were Muslims.107 In 2004, the Registrar General of India, responsible for overseeing the Census, released a data breakdown on religious basis showing that the state’s Muslim population had risen at a higher rate when compared to that across India (and second only to the Muslim-majority territory of Kashmir).108 This lent a communalistic spin to the primarily linguistic and cultural antagonism in the state, with claims of an Islamic infiltration from Bangladesh, particularly in the border districts.109 Over the years, political leaders have appropriated this point to assert that the intention of the community was to reduce the Hindu-populace to a minority.110 (a) The Assam Accord The Assam Accord of 1985, a trilateral agreement between the Government of India (GoI), the state of Assam and nationalist parties in the Assam state, laid the basis for the current update in the Citizen Register. The Accord’s objective was to identify, detain and deport “illegal migrants” who entered the state after 1971. In 1951, the GoI enacted the Migrants (Expulsion from Assam) 106 See, Assam Accord 1985, Government of Assam, clause 6, online: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN_850815_Assam%20Accord.pdf>. The Clause promises to undertake constitutional and administrative safeguards for preserving, promoting and protecting the cultural, social and linguistic heritage and identity of the people. 107 Murshid, supra note 104 at 589. 108 Wasbir Hussain, “Demographic Jitters”, Outlook (20 September 2004), online: <https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/demographic-jitters/225190>. 109 Pinku Muktiar, Prafulla Nath & Mahesh Deka, “The Communal Politics of Eviction Drives in Assam”, Economic and Political Weekly (2018), online: <https://www.epw.in/engage/article/communal-politics-eviction-drivesassam>. 6 of Assam’s 27 districts have a Muslim-majority. These claims fail to acknowledge that the border regions often undergo land swaps, and hence lands formerly lying within the Bangladesh territory, would obviously have a higher Muslim demography. Most of the Muslim population resides in the Brahmaputra region (riverine areas), and hence when they are forced to displace because of flood-like situations, they are more visible to the urban population that sees them as fresh migrants. In several cases they have also been forcefully evicted without compensation. Another explanation for the higher numbers was also that, following the Nehru-Liaqat pact, a number of Muslims who had left for East Pakistan during partition on account of violence, returned to their lands in 1951, but their names had not been included in the 1951 Census. When the census was conducted in 1961, these numbers were reflected. See, Anindita Dasgupta, “The Myth of the Assamese Bangladeshi”, Himal Mag (31 July 2018), online: <https://www.himalmag.com/the-myth-of-the-assamese-bangladeshi/>. 110 Murshid, supra note 104 at 587-589 (the consolidation amongst the Hindus in Assam took place through construction of a common enemy). https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol8/iss1/1 DOI: 10.60082/2563-4631.1096 18