Chakrabarty: Citizenship Deprivation as an Act of Persecution: Case Study of t there is a difference between denying citizenship (for instance, to long-term residents) and divesting someone of citizenship (in this case, a birth citizen). The latter, especially when undertaken over ethnic basis, could amount to a “particularly acute form of persecution”. 87 In another decision, Stserba v. Holder,88 an Estonian citizen of Russian origin initially lost her citizenship after the former’s independence (over newly enacted laws). Although she managed to regain her citizenship through naturalization, Estonia brought out a law that restricted economic opportunities for those who received their qualifications from Russian Universities.89 With respect to her claim of persecution, the immigration judge noted that long-term residents of Russian origin could access most of the rights - including residence, travel documents, and political participation at the local level, and that 65,000 Russian origin Estonians, had already been naturalized.90 The Appellate court again made some exemplary observations - that the question should not have been restricted to actual harm, since in the absence of citizenship, the rights that these individuals enjoyed stood on precarious grounds.91 More importantly, it observed that even neutral-appearing laws could be used to target a vulnerable population. 92 In brief, both these decisions show that (a) statelessness itself without anything further, suffices the “severe harm” standards - although it may not always amount to persecution; 93 (b) affirmative actions of state lead to a higher presumption of persecution as opposed to the failure to confer; (c) that the authorities must not only evaluate legislations and policies, but also look at their possible impact and the context behind such implementation; and (d) statelessness when linked with a protected ground, will always amount to persecution 94. In spite of the limited jurisprudence on statelessness per se amounting to persecution, both ICL95 and IRL96 agree that acts can also cumulatively lead to persecution. As mentioned previously, nationality rights are concomitant with other rights, including those of residence, liberty, access 87 Ibid at 573-74 and Haile v Gonzales, 421 F. 3d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2005). 646 F.3d 904 (6th Cir.). 89 Ibid at 968-69. 90 Ibid at 971-74. 91 Ibid at 974. 92 Ibid at 975. 93 See, Choudry v Canada, [2011] FC 1406 (Can.), at paras. 32-40. 94 Fullerton, supra note 41. 95 Prosecutor v Kvocka et al, IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment (28 February 2005), at para 321. 96 See statement of UNHCR Spokesperson, Erika Feller, cited in Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 62. 88 Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2021 15