Bangladesh, Burma and the Rohingya crisis 35 there are people who want to continue a transition that is already in place? It is not as if the military was still in place and there was a solely military Government.102 72. However, David Baulk argued: The behaviour of the Government of Myanmar in recent years at the very least calls into question the support that this Government give around parliamentary development in Naypyidaw. We have seen quite consistently people arguing that there are reform‑minded parliamentarians in Myanmar and reform‑minded uniformed personnel in the Government, and they have been silent in recent months as the international community has cried genocide and other atrocity crimes in Rakhine State and elsewhere. It is very important that the Department for International Development and the UK Government more broadly think very seriously about how supporting this Government with parliamentary development could be supporting the very people who should be at the International Criminal Court.103 73. There is an argument that MPs could be empowered by enabling their constituents to hold them to account, thereby strengthening their willingness to speak out. This could be an effective alternative form of Parliamentary support building. A stronger emphasis is needed on alternatives, that support good people but in different forms than current programmes via government support. 74. All aid organisations need to keep under review their terms of engagement with state institutions in countries where there are substantial human rights concerns. We recommend that DFID, together with the WFD and the UK Parliament and other UK organisations supporting the ‘Pyidaungsu Hluttaw’—coordinate in securing an objective review of such programmes. This review needs to determine if any substantive progress has been made in equipping and/or inspiring the Burmese legislature to do more to hold the government to account, engage the public or other flexing of parliamentary muscle. If little or nothing tangible has been achieved, we recommend suspending these programmes. Engagement with the Burmese government 75. We considered the following statements from DFID: 102 103 • No direct financial aid goes to Government of Burma. • [we are] working through technical assistance to reform-minded ministries to strengthen capacity in civilian government. • The Rohingya crisis [ … ] has further exposed the very real challenges of the Burmese military’s continued significant influence on the country’s governance. • DFID Burma provides indirect support to Burma’s Ministry of Finance and Planning to monitor and better report progress against the Sustainable Development Goals. Q247 Q169