134 COLUM. J. RACE & L. [Vol. 11:83 The court maintained that “no legal act” that conflicts with the principle of non-discrimination is acceptable, 224 and further characterized the jus cogens status of non-discrimination as deriving “directly from the oneness of the human family and . . . linked to the essential dignity of the individual.” 225 Importantly, the court affirmed the status of the prohibition on discrimination as jus cogens in the Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic. 226 Specifically in the context of the right to nationality, the court stated that the prohibition: [R]equires States, when regulating the mechanisms for granting nationality, to abstain from establishing discriminatory regulations or regulations that have discriminatory effects on different groups of a population when they exercise their rights.227 Numerous preeminent scholars regard the prohibition on racial discrimination as possessing the status of a jus cogens norm. As noted above, in most instances the listing of racial discrimination has not been accompanied with any analysis of the content of this prohibition. In the third edition of the influential Principles of Public International Law, Ian Brownlie states that the principle of racial non-discrimination is one of the “least controversial” examples of a peremptory norm, together with the prohibition of the use of force, the law of genocide, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting the slave trade and piracy. 228 Similarly, Schwelb notes that “if there is a subject 224 Judicial Condition and the Rights of Undocumented Migrants, supra note 223, ¶ 101. 225 Id. ¶ 87. 226 Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, ¶ 264 (Aug. 28, 2014). 227 Id. Domestic courts have reiterated the status of the prohibition on racial discrimination. See, e.g., R (European Roma Rights Centre) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, [46] (“State practice virtually universally condemns discrimination on grounds of race. It does so in recognition of the fact that it has become unlawful in international law to discriminate on the grounds of race.”). See also Comm. of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (including racial discrimination as one of the norms to “arguably . . . meet the stringent criteria for jus cogens.”). 228 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 510–13 (3d ed. 1980) (noting also that ICERD itself could be added to the existing/suggested body of jus cogens). Other examples of jus cogens norms include rules prohibiting aggressive war, the law of genocide, trade in slaves,