112 COLUM. J. RACE & L. [Vol. 11:83 However, the concerns around the inclusion of the words “national origin” and its relevance to nationality laws in ICERD were also animated, at least in part, by a desire on the part of powerful, developed states to “assure states parties that due respect is given to state sovereignty in areas concerning naturalization.”123 For example, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the term “national origin” tended to confuse the issue because “such a provision [regarding nationality] would do away with the special facilities given by States to those of their nationals who, having changed their nationality, subsequently wished to recover their original nationality . . . as compared with aliens desiring to acquire that nationality by naturalization.”124 Similarly, the representative of France explained that the inclusion of the words “national origin” might “impair the principle that temporary measures taken by Governments with regards to naturalised persons did not constitute discrimination.”125 The representative of Italy likewise explained that the mention of national origin would “raise difficulties in economic rights set forth in the draft Covenant.”)). See also Alice Edwards, Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right to Enjoy Asylum, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 293 (2005) (asserting that the “purpose of Article 2(3) was to end the domination of certain economic groups of non-nationals during colonial times,” but that the provision should be narrowly construed). 123 Drew Mahalic & Joan Gambee Mahalic, The Limitation Provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 74, 79, 82 (1987). 124 Schwelb, Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 100, at 1010, refers to this comment, and others like it, as an attempt at “maintaining disabilities of naturalised persons” and argues that this is the key animating consideration that gave rise to Article 1(3). The representative of the United Kingdom added that since the definition of racial discrimination in paragraph 1 was exceedingly broad, certain legitimate differentiations based on national origin might conceivably be prohibited under the convention if the words were retained. For example, in the United Kingdom, preference was given to married women who had lost their British nationality in assisting them to reacquire that nationality; such preference could not be deemed discrimination. U.N. ESCOR, Summary Record of the 786th Meeting, 20th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.786 (Apr. 21, 1964). 125 Schwelb, Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 100, at 1010. See Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Rep. of the Prevention and Protection of Minorities Subcomm. on Its Fourteenth Session, 42, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/830 (Feb. 8. 1962). In making this claim, the representative of France pointed to the Report of the 14th session of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minority Rights to the Commission on Human Rights, in which it was asserted that an insistence upon an over-generous policy of granting full political rights immediately to all naturalized persons might discourage nations from giving nationality to many applicants as the view that all naturalized persons should enjoy the same political rights as any other national was not shared by every State.