to enter and remain in one’s own country.10 It has further held that citizenship deprivation must be subject to careful scrutiny, including an assessment of its potential arbitrariness, procedural fairness, and proportionality.11 In Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, the Court emphasised the need to examine the practical consequences of citizenship deprivation, including the risk of exclusion from effective protection.12 23. States’ discretionary citizenship deprivation powers are subject to the right to nationality of the individual concerned, the prohibition of arbitrary citizenship deprivation, the discrimination prohibition and the obligation to avoid statelessness. Furthermore, the impact of citizenship deprivation on the enjoyment of other human rights must be taken into consideration when assessing the legality of citizenship deprivation. Other rights include the right to enter and remain in one’s own country, the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to private and family life; the rights of the child; and freedom from slavery, forced labour and trafficking. Any citizenship deprivation measures must also comply with due process safeguards.13 Accordingly, where a State pursues citizenship deprivation, which profoundly and permanently interferes with the individual’s article 8 rights, it must ensure that the decisionmaking process is compatible with its Convention obligations, including those arising under Article 4, particularly where credible evidence attests that the individual concerned is a trafficking victim. 24. Article 4 imposes operational, investigative, and protective duties, including to identify potential and actual trafficking victims and to take reasonable steps where there is a credible suspicion of exploitation. 14 These obligations arise where authorities “knew or ought to have known” of a real risk of trafficking.15 25. The State cannot treat citizenship deprivation as a self-contained national security measure insulated from its international law obligations. On the contrary, where deprivation is contemplated, particularly in respect of an individual who may have been trafficked as a child, the State is obliged to conduct a prior, rigorous assessment of trafficking indicators and their legal consequences. Being a non-derogable right, the Contracting Parties obligations under Article 4 are not displaced by national security considerations, which must be weighed against the Convention’s object and purpose, that is, to respect human rights. 26. Failure to do so has a dual effect: it undermines compliance with Article 4 and renders the citizenship deprivation’s interference with Article 8 procedurally deficient and substantively disproportionate. Further, the very lawfulness of the citizenship deprivation decision directly hinges on whether the individual concerned was identified, properly or at all, as a trafficking victim and afforded the rights that flowed from Article 4. The interveners submit that such an identification failure would be one of the critical factors rendering the citizenship deprivation decision arbitrary. Indeed, in the circumstances, the citizenship deprivation decision violates Article 8 and compounds the Article 4 violations. 27. A subsidiary consideration concerns the distinction between formal or theoretical citizenship and effective citizenship in practice, versus a purported putative entitlement to an alternative citizenship. The Court’s Article 8 analysis requires a practical and reality-based assessment of the consequences of citizenship deprivation. As recognised in Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom,16 the compatibility of deprivation measures with the Convention must be assessed by reference to their real-world effects, including whether the individual concerned is left without effective protection. Reliance on the theoretical existence of another citizenship, which cannot be meaningfully exercised, falls short of the State’s obligation to avoid statelessness.17 28. The formal or theoretical citizenship distinction assumes added importance in trafficking cases. Exploited individuals often lack the ability to avail themselves of consular protection or to assert citizenship rights in practice. A formalistic approach risks obscuring this vulnerability and undermining both the protective purpose of Article 4 and the Article 8 safeguards. In any such contexts, the need for a rigorous assessment of 10 See ECtHR, Karassev v. Finland (1999) App no. 31414/96; Genovese v. Malta (2011) App no. 53124/09, para. 30; Ramadan v. Malta (2016) App no. 76136/12, para. 85. 11 ECtHR, K2 v. the United Kingdom (December 2017) App no 42387/13, paras 49-50; Ghoumid and Others v. France (2020) Apps nos. 52273/16 and others, paras 43-48. 12 ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom (2011) App no 27021/08, paras 99-101. 13 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Principles on Deprivation of Nationality as a National Security Measure (March 2020) Principles 3 – 9. 14 ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010) App no 25965/04, paras 282-289; Chowdury and Others v. Greece (2017) App no. 21884/15, paras 103-104. 15 ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010) App no 25965/04, para. 286. 16 ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom (2011) App no 27021/08, paras 99-101. 17 See Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Principles on Deprivation of Nationality as a National Security Measure (March 2020) Principles; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons (2014); Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (adopted 30 August 1961, entered into force 13 December 1975) 989 UNTS 175. 4