for the said violations; the interveners submit that the individual concerned was at all material times within the Contracting Party’s Article 1 jurisdiction with respect to the violations of the Convention as alleged by the individual concerned. 15. A fortiori when such an individual was a child at the material time. A fortiori also if failure to find that at all material times the individual was within the Contracting Party’s Article 1 jurisdiction for the purposes of their well-founded complaints of Convention rights’ violations would result in the Contracting Party in question escaping all accountability, notwithstanding substantial liability for its knowing failure to intervene to prevent abuses when under duty to do so, and then its failure to provide redress, reparation and restitution measures. 16. A fortiori, also because, by analogy with the ex turpi causa non oritur actio principle, when the individual concerned is no longer on the Contracting Party’s territory as a result of having been trafficked across its borders, but where there is a causal link between that fact and the Contracting Party’s failure to take all reasonable measures to protect the individual concerned against the real risk of being trafficked abroad, notwithstanding the fact that the Contracting Party was aware of such a risk, then the Contracting Party in question cannot be allowed to rely on the absence of the individual concerned from its territory to escape its liability for egregious human rights violations for which it is, in part, responsible (ex turpi causa non oritur actio). PART 2: OBSERVATIONS ON MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE COURT’S DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS 2, 3 AND 4 17. The trafficking of an individual across a Contracting Party’s borders may engage Article 4, which places positive obligations on the Contracting Party of investigation, protection and recovery in relation to victims of trafficking. If, subsequent to the individual concerned having been trafficked across the Contracting Party’s borders, the authorities decide to deprive the individual concerned of citizenship, their decision will engage Article 8, which protects the right to nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, as intrinsic to the right to private and family life. 18. In light of this, the interveners submit that answering questions 2, 3 and 4 requires further inquiry into both these Convention rights. This integrated approach reflects the Court’s established doctrine that Convention rights be interpreted and applied in a manner that renders them “practical and effective” rather than “theoretical or illusory”.8 It ensures that Contracting Parties cannot avoid their anti-trafficking obligations under Article 4 by resorting to arbitrary citizenship deprivation in violation of Article 8. 19. Contracting parties’ positive obligations of investigation, protection and recovery in relation to trafficking victims must not be circumvented by citizenship deprivation decisions. 20. A Contracting Party’s discretionary citizenship deprivation powers must be exercised consistent with its international law obligations, including in relation to trafficking, such as those arising under the Convention. Failure to comply would result in a violation of Article 8 and Article 4. 21. In light of this, whether an individual might have been a victim of trafficking is a juridically relevant consideration in deciding whether to deprive the individual concerned of their citizenship, would be arbitrary or not. Further, the Contracting Parties would also be under an obligation to anticipate and consider the consequences of a prospective citizenship deprivation decision, if any, on the Article 4 rights of the individual concerned, as well as on their own Article 4 obligations. Finally, a citizenship deprivation decision without the Article 6 safeguards applicable to a criminal trial would be analogous to a criminal prosecution. The individual concerned would be subjected to a “penalty” of a criminal nature, without having been charged, tried and convicted in fair proceedings. As such, citizenship deprivation would constitute a “penalty” within the meaning of Article 26 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Below, the interveners provide further elaboration in this regard. Article 8 as juridically relevant to an Article 4 analysis 22. The Court has consistently recognised that citizenship falls within the ambit of Article 8 as an element of social identity,9 given its impact on an individual’s private life, legal identity, and social ties and the right 8 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland (1979) App no. 6289/73, para. 24. 9 ECtHR, Genovese v. Malta (2011), App no 53124/09, para. 33. 3