this group brings to our attention the relationship between resistance and autonomy, and the legitimacy of the contract between the state and its peoples. This rather fleeting overview presents a diverse group of legal statuses that exist both inside and outside of the boundaries of membership. All of these cases are united, however, in two predominant ways: firstly, by resistance to the “political” as an illegitimate occupier of one’s sense of justice; and secondly, through a claim to individual or community sovereignty. Each of these accounts highlights issues related to the “micro” and “macro” levels of individual-state relations including social, economic, political, and legal identities, and rationales concerning taking control of one’s relationship to the state. These cases raise several questions with respect to individual-society-state relations relating to membership, sovereignty, autonomy, oppression, radical politics, agency, self-determination, and acts of (non)citizenship. Implications for International Relations and Political Theory The purpose of this piece is to reflect on how voluntary statelessness may interact with international relations and political theory. The term voluntary statelessness itself is an apt introduction to this phenomenon. How can we ensure one has truly volunteered to become stateless? How is such consent perceived through time and space, and between individuals and groups? What role does duress play in such decisions?6 Furthermore, are these individuals and groups legally stateless? Should this be tested amongst those who desire to be ‘hidden’ and, if so, how? I set aside these concerns and turn to the ways in which these experiences encourage us to think about sovereignty, global governance, obligation, and membership. Sovereignty Sovereignty is a long standing principle in international relations and is considered by some to be the building block of the modern state system (Krasner 2001: 230). The firm but delicate balance of power between states allows each to control their internal affairs, determine who is allowed to enter and remain in the country, and the obligations mem- and Nationality Act §. 349(a)(5)), and Canada requires one to have a second nationality before it will facilitate renunciation of its citizenship (§. 9(1)(a) Citizenship Act, R.S.C, 1985, c. C-29). Freemen also advocate retaining one’s birth certificate as it is “the only proof you are a live natural born human/person” (FreeMan Society of Canada 2012). 6 For a look at the role duress plays in renouncing citizenship see Lauer 2006. Yaser Esam Hamdi was born in the United States but lived most of his life in Saudi Arabia, a citizen of both countries. He was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay for suspected terrorist activities against the United States. He was released from Guantanamo Bay in 2004 and repatriated to Saudi Arabia on the condition that he renounce his United States citizenship. Though Hamdi was not rendered stateless due to his renunciation of U.S. citizenship, this case raises concerns over the practice of demanding ‘voluntary’ renunciation in exchange for one’s freedom. This speaks to the broader themes of being caught between two places of ‘non-freedom’ and having to choose between the two. http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home 47