10 A. Shachar required; only the investment monies must ‘reside’ in the country for a fixed term. This is to be distinguished from more traditional programmes, themselves the subject of perennial critique, under which migrant millionaires (to borrow David Ley’s apt term) can receive an admission visa through a designated business-investment stream, but would then have to more or less comply with standard residency and naturalisation requirements5. Such programmes are found in, among other places, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom and the United States. Both kinds of programme raise serious ethical quandaries, but the unfettered cash-for-passport programmes are more extreme and blatant than the traditional investment programmes. They contribute to some of the most disturbing developments in 21st-century citizenship, including the emergence of new forms of inequality and stratification. Instead of retreating to the background as some theorists had forecasted, states are proactively creating and exacerbating inequalities through their selective and managed migration policies, setting up easy-pass citizenship for some while making membership more restrictive and difficult to achieve for others. This new world order reveals tectonic pressures and introduces urgent dilemmas about the proper scale, scope and relations of justice and mobility, citizenship and (selective) openness. These developments also bear a profound impact on immigration law and policy on the ground, since they entail processes through which the boundary between state and market is constantly being tested, eroded, and blurred. It is these intricate and underexplored interactions between state and market that are at the heart of my inquiry into emerging selective migration regimes and transactional visions of citizenship6. Legally, the sovereign prerogative to issue a valid and internationally recognised passport is reserved in our international system to states alone. Governments and only governments – not markets – can secure and allocate the precious legal good of membership in the political community. But what happens when the logic of capital and markets infiltrates this classic statist expression of sovereignty? The proliferation of what I have called unfettered cash-for-passport programmes is a dramatic example of this pattern at work and it invites our 5 6 Dzankic, J. (2012), ‘The Pros and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship in Comparative Perspective’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory Working Paper 2012/14, Florence: European University Institute, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/21476 Shachar, A. (2006), ‘The Global Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes’, NYU Law Review 81 (2006): 148-206; Shachar, A. (forthcoming), Olympic Citizenship: Migration and the Global Race for Talent. Oxford: Oxford University Press.