Towards a Stateless Standpoint Epistemology social order. 10 In this sense, knowledge of society coming from the standpoint of the working class, for example, is more ‘objective’ than what the dominant class maintains, as the exploited are more aware of their conditions. This is what Harding calls ‘strong objectivity’, in contrast to objectivity that presupposes impartial observation in a positivist sense. 11 Knowledge produced from a standpoint informed by the experience of the knowing subject thus becomes more trustworthy than what is produced through detached observation. Reality as experienced by the exploited, oppressed or persecuted, for instance, creates the conditions in which they recognise their positions and their place in the world as well as the standpoints through which they communicate and inform stronger knowledge about these conditions. 12 In the standpoint perspective, objective knowledge is not about being more neutral or employing more observations, instead, it is about acknowledging that reality is subjective, and that ‘strong objectivity’ can be found in the standpoint of those who live, experience and challenge that reality. The feminist standpoint theory has unsurprisingly been critiqued for its ambivalence towards the dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity, or between concept and reality, by situating knowledge in ‘women’s lives’ along a continuum, and thus preserving or acknowledging the existence of the dichotomy it has set to deconstruct. 13 Moreover, while the feminist standpoint theory has challenged previous forms of knowledge on women, critics have indicated that the theory (especially through the manifestations of its early pioneers) has fallen into the trap of essentialising itself. 14 In this sense, the feminist standpoint theory has been accused of engendering a generalised understanding of experiences of women as essentially the same and universal while obscuring diversity. 15 Indeed, such criticism of the feminist standpoint theory has contributed to its further development in becoming a systematic method for voicing the intersecting dilemmas of marginalised groups. As Harding herself remarked, such controversiality on the idea of standpoint epistemology has been ‘a valuable resource’ through which the theory has contributed to political, philosophic and scientific debates. 16 Since delineating a full outline of these unresolved controversies is beyond this commentary’s scope, some of the theoretical underpinnings and critique of the standpoint theory are further discussed through applying them onto the case of statelessness research. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives (Cornell University Press 1991) 59; Harding, ‘“Strong Objectivity”: A Response to the New Objectivity Question’ (n 9) 343–44. Harding, ‘“Strong Objectivity”: A Response to the New Objectivity Question’ (n 9) 348. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives (n 10) 59; Harding, ‘“Strong Objectivity”: A Response to the New Objectivity Question’ (n 9) 343; Gaile Pohlhaus, ‘Knowing Communities: An Investigation of Harding’s Standpoint Epistemology’ (2002) 16(3) Social Epistemology 283, 285. Susan Hekman, ‘Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited’ (1997) 22(2) Signs 341, 347–48. Catherine M O’Leary, ‘Counteridentification or Counterhegemony? Transforming Feminist Standpoint Theory’ (1998) 18(3) Women & Politics 45, 54–55. ibid 55. Harding, The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader (n 9) 1. 115