Caroline Sawyer, Helena Wray that there was a duty to explain a refusal in at least some instances.8 Most nationality decisions do not carry a right of appeal (for difficulties in exercising those appeal rights that do exist, see 3.3 on deprivation of citizenship below) but the legality of a decision may be judicially reviewed. Compared to immigration and asylum law, there is relatively little jurisprudence on which to draw, and human rights and EU law have not made a mark in this area. The Home Office will often cede a claim shortly before a hearing if it fears an unfavourable precedent. In the absence of much legal aid provision, it takes a particularly determined and fortunate litigant even to begin proceedings, and cases that are settled will not change the apparent law on which others are entitled formally to base their own claims. 1.3 Ambiguity of conceptual boundaries Historically, and in common with other common law countries, the UK operated on the basis of complete ius soli, a concept that, as discussed below, originated in ideas about allegiance that predate the modern concept of nationality. Elements of ius sanguinis have also been present, and nationality was overwhelmingly inclusive. This was congruent with British expansionism which, combined with a pragmatic attribution of various legal statuses, meant that the legal and physical boundaries of Empire were uncertain, with ramifications that are still felt. Inclusivity was checked by the British Nationality Act 1948 where the UK recognised that independent Commonwealth countries would determine their own rules on nationality even if the unifying concept of ‘subject’ remained. Inclusivity was definitively reversed by the British Nationality Act 1981 although, in reality, the reversal was anticipated by the incursions into the free movement of citizens and subjects created by previous immigration legislation (Commonwealth Immigrants Acts 1962 and 1968 and Immigration Act 1971); it was already apparent that an open model did not suit new conditions. The 1981 Act partially removed the right of ius soli, reserving it, in respect of those born after 1st January 1983, to the children of settled residents or British citizens. This was influenced by concern that British citizenship was being attributed to the children of transient parents, and this change predated the same move by other formerly British countries such as Ireland or New Zealand.9 Although mitigated by a relatively straightforward registration process for the stateless and for children whose future was later shown to lie in the UK, it represented a fundamental change to the underlying principle upon which membership was recognised. The effects of this are only now becoming fully apparent as a generation has grown up without the guarantee of nationality in their place of birth. There is little in the way of a clear and unified national ethnic or cultural myth to justify the pragmatic mixture of ius sanguinis and ius solis which the 1981 Act initiated and later developments have only underscored the absence of a collective sense of what Britishness means. Nationality has long been treated as an extension of the immigration system despite attempts by the Labour government to make naturalisation into a more meaningful personal commitment through the introduction of integration tests and citizenship ceremonies in the mid-2000s. Even the integration requirements are, in practice, immigration tests as they apply also to most migrants seeking settlement and are not retaken for naturalisation. This inverted relationship, by which immigration concerns have driven citizenship policy rather than the other way round, was evident in other ways in the 1981 Act. In particular, the creation of a hierarchy of citizenship statuses (discussed 8 s. 7 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ; R v SSHD (ex p. Al-Fayed ) no. 1 [1998] 1 WLR 763 9 Ireland lost the ius soli after 2004 and New Zealand after 2005. 4 RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR 2014/1 - © 2014 Authors