S868 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [56:S855 States’ ability to restrict entry. 80 Beyond this, however, treaties provided no guidance regarding the implications of nationality. Neither the ILA’s Committee nor the preparatory committee for the Draft Convention discussed what, precisely, nationality entailed. Indeed, a comment to Article 1 of the Draft Convention noted, “No attempt is made in this draft to define the meaning of allegiance.” 81 Scholars found State practice regarding the implications of nationality too varied to codify or even develop. 82 Though some scholars had attempted to equate nationality with citizenship, the preparatory committee for the Draft Convention rejected the notion that nationality “necessarily involve[s] the right or privilege of exercising civil or political functions.” 83 States had, since the development of territorial sovereignty, distinguished between citizens “participating in the sovereign power” and subjects merely “subjected to the laws of the State.” 84 2. Nationality and Diplomatic Protection Though nationality did not secure particular citizen rights, it was of great importance, as evidenced by the extensive discussion regarding how nationality ought to be extended. Diplomatic protection, only available by virtue of nationality, provided the exclusive avenue for bringing individuals’ international claims. Stateless individuals had no recourse for State-caused injury and had no international legal rights. In the 1931 Dickson Car Wheel Company Case, the Mexico/U.S. General Claims Commission declared, “A State . . . does not commit an international delinquency in inflicting an injury upon an individual lacking nationality, and consequently, no State is empowered to intervene or complain on his behalf either before or 80. See generally Reale, supra note 48. 81. Harvard Draft Convention on Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. SPECIAL SUPP. at 23; Maximillian Koessler, “Subject,” “Citizen,” “National,” and “Permanent Allegiance”, 56 YALE L.J. 58, 69 (1947) (quoting the Commentary to Article 1 of the Draft Convention). 82. Id. (“It may be observed, however, that the ‘tie of allegiance’ is a term in general use to denote the sum of the obligations of a natural person to the state to which he belongs. The draft itself does not spell out these obligations, since they are quite different in different societies”). 83. Id.; See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (refusing female citizens the franchise); Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904) (holding that Puerto Ricans are not “aliens” or “alien immigrants” but refusing to recognize Puerto Ricans as full citizens). 84. Koessler, supra note 81, at 61 (quoting Rousseau’s distinction between the two concepts). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954729