Faye Journal of International Humanitarian Action (2021) 6:13 mounting, and by July 1978, the mortality rate in the camps was four times higher than the rest of Bangladesh. The UNHCR staff member noted that the Bangladesh government policy has become one that starves refugees prompting them to leave. The lack of basic needs resulted to widespread malnutrition and death rates (Crisp 2018). At the end of the repatriation process in January 1980, during press conference, the UNHCR acknowledged that 10,000 refugees had died in the camps, referring to epidemics as the principal cause. However, privately, staff in the field acknowledged government failure to deliver food supplies which was readily available as the cause of the high mortality rate. However, this is not an excuse for organisations like the UNHCR whose responsibility includes providing welfare to comply with a policy resulting to more than 9000 superfluous deaths (Crisp 2018). Contrary to the UNHCR protection responsibilities, refugees were not consulted about the repatriation process and what waited on them. The UNHCR did very little effort to halt the abuses faced by the Rohingyas in the camps, although two field staffs have tried to raise the issue, they were remove from the operation. In an effort to deflect criticism, the UNHCR has stated that it has little involvement in the repatriation and argues that they did not have the mandate responsible of determining the voluntary character of the decision taken by refugees to return. During this time, any form of advocacy on human rights issues in Myanmar was perceived as a threat to the ruling power, predominantly those that talked about the Rohingya crisis. The failure of this intervention by the UNHCR threatened the lives of their officials working in the country. Following the intricacies of domestic insurgency, the UNHCR established a number of refugee camps in the nearest state borders next to Myanmar region mainly in Bangladesh the closest neighbouring state. Consequently, this led to the first attempt by the UNHCR to build a camp outside Myanmar for early rehabilitation and temporary resettlement, by providing temporary housing and livelihood aids for conflict-affected refugees. This was the first strategy employed by the UNHCR to intervene in the crisis. This had also scaled up fundraising campaign to receive basic logistics supplies such as food and medical facilities. Additionally, the UNHCR also made available doctors to mobile around the camps for emergency purposes. The UNHCR further adopted several policies for a more strategic service delivery based on international enforcement of the non-refoulement principle in Geneva convention 1951. The convention claimed those with refugees be resettled in camps whether formally registered or not or taking voluntary consent from the refugee in person. Page 4 of 7 It is important to note that one of the characteristics of Southeast Asian states is that majority of them are not signatories to international treaties concerning migrants and refugee that might provide protection for the rights of Rohingya migrants. Additionally, ASEAN member states are legally sealed by a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation within the ASEAN constitutional framework which strictly preserves the prevention to breach domestic issues of the other member-state (ASEAN 1976). This absurdity exposes another standstill situation that ruined the mitigation of Rohingya situation. As a result of this, neighbouring states can deliver but only limited to raising and sending aids. International customary norms can be activated as the basis to protect the rights to life, and therefore, the Non-Refoulement principle may enter into force in the absence of legal framework. The basis of non-refoulement is supported out by UNHCR in every humanitarian mission to guard principal human rights (Jacqueline Joyce F, 2010). Regarding human rights, it is clear that certain rights are inviolable right and cannot be taken from the human being. Therefore, non-signatory states or signatory state is expected to carry out non-violent approach in humanitarianism in respect of human rights. In 2007, the UNHCR issued an Advisory Opinion emphasising the importance of state commitment to the principle of Non-Refoulement. It is also important to stress that immigration officers of the third state are obliged to guarantee the safety of refugees so as not to experience the same human rights abuse in the destination country. Based on this principle, the UNHCR provides two options. First is to offer voluntary repatriation to Rakhine state or to set up a new relocation site to enable local community integration with the host native inhabitants (voluntary consent). This is to prevent migrants being force which can result to another causality. ASEAN intervention The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been cognisant of the Rohingya’s dilemma since the 1990s. This problem was recognised by countries like Malaysia and Thailand. Due to the high influx of migrants into Bangladesh and the trafficking of Muslims into both Malaysia and Thailand, the governments of Thailand and Malaysia had signalled that this problem cannot be taken as domestic issue as it might create a potential area of instability in the region or human suffering. However, when Myanmar joined the ASEAN, the issue of Rohingyas was ignored by ASEAN to address some of the difficulties faced by Rohingya’s or problem caused by other state which might be a threat to regional integrity (Rahman 2015; Parnini 2013). In Myanmar, the ruling regime obstinately declined to recognise the Rohingyas as citizens and not part of the