4 SESSIONS v. MORALES-SANTANA Syllabus continuously present in the United States for one year at any point in her life prior to the child’s birth; but it may not be transmitted by a U. S.-citizen father who falls a few days short of meeting §1401(a)(7)’s longer physical-presence requirements, even if he acknowledges pa­ ternity on the day the child is born and raises the child in the United States. Pp. 17–19. (2) The Government also maintains that Congress wished to reduce the risk of statelessness for the foreign-born child of a U. S. citizen. But congressional hearings and reports offer no support for the assertion that a statelessness concern prompted the diverse phys­ ical-presence requirements. Nor has the Government shown that the risk of statelessness disproportionately endangered the children of unwed U. S.-citizen mothers. Pp. 19–23. 2. Because this Court is not equipped to convert §1409(c)’s excep­ tion for unwed U. S.-citizen mothers into the main rule displacing §§1401(a)(7) and 1409(a), it falls to Congress to select a uniform pre­ scription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the ba­ sis of gender. In the interim, §1401(a)(7)’s current requirement should apply, prospectively, to children born to unwed U. S.-citizen mothers. The legislature’s intent, as revealed by the statute at hand, governs the choice between the two remedial alternatives: extending favorable treatment to the excluded class or withdrawing favorable treatment from the favored class. Ordinarily, the preferred rule is to extend favorable treatment. Westcott, 443 U. S., at 89–90. Here, however, extension to fathers of §1409(c)’s favorable treatment for mothers would displace Congress’ general rule, the longer physicalpresence requirements of §§1401(a)(7) and 1409 applicable to unwed U. S.-citizen fathers and U. S.-citizen parents, male as well as female, married to the child’s alien parent. Congress’ “ ‘commitment to th[is] residual policy’ ” and “ ‘the degree of potential disruption of the statu­ tory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to abroga­ tion,’ ” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 739, n. 5, indicate that Congress would likely have abrogated §1409(c)’s special exception, preferring to preserve “the importance of residence in this country as the talisman of dedicated attachment,” Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U. S. 815, 834. Pp. 23–28. 804 F. 3d 520, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part, in which ALITO, J., joined. GORSUCH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.