certain States would cease recognition, given that nationality would be dependent on the recognition by a particular State, individuals would be left in a situation whereby they could be considered stateless in relation to some States but not others.110 As noted, it would also be possible to envisage the ending of statehood as such but continued existence as an entity with international personality, such as that enjoyed by the Sovereign Order of Malta. If the extinction of the State concerned were accepted, whether implicitly or explicitly, the entire population of the affected State would be rendered stateless,111 and they would remain stateless unless they acquired the nationality of another State.112 It should be noted that the risk of statelessness, de facto or de jure, that might arise would be without prejudice to the common identity of the inhabitants of a low-lying island State, as a people with a specific cultural and social identity. The case of low-lying island States, thus, raises additional important considerations in terms of the protection of the rights of a people with a specific social and cultural identity, history and traditions.113 ‘persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality’. See also Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in relation to State Succession, E.T.S. No. 200, signed in Strasbourg, 19 May 2006, entered into force 1 May 2009, Art. 3 (‘Prevention of Statelessness), para. 16: ‘State succession may well create situations of de facto statelessness where persons do have the nationality of one of the States concerned but are unable to benefit from the protection of that State.’ See also H. Massey, ‘UNHCR and de facto statelessness’, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, LPPR/2010/01, April 2010, in particular 61-65, available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/4bc2ddeb9.html (last accessed 29 May 2011). 110 Moreover, there is precedent for considering a population stateless even where the demise of the State is not accepted. For instance, the Baltic States, were occupied by Germany during WWII, and subsequently annexed by the former Soviet Union until 1991, when independence was restored. Continuity of the same State was largely accepted although all signs of statehood had ceased for an extended period, see for example Penart v. Estonia. European Court of Human Rights, Decision on admissibility, Appl. No. 14685/04, available online at: http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=penart&sessionid= 65720691&skin=hudoc-en (last accessed 25 January 2011). Crawford notes in this regard, however, that continuity in the case of the Baltic States could be questioned, since all authority was suppressed completely for a period of fifty years and their annexation was widely accepted even if only tacitly so. He acknowledges, however, that other States largely accepted the argument of continuity made by the Baltic States; see Crawford, note 27 above, 689-699, 703. Grahl-Madsen notes that persons from the Baltic States who found themselves in third States were considered by many States to be stateless in the interim period, inasmuch as they had not acquired another nationality, although others treated them as Soviet citizens; see Grahl-Madsen, note 51 above, 260. 111 This would exclude third-country nationals present on the affected island States. 112 This would be the case if individuals with links to another State acquired citizenship there. Another possibility would be where the State would become part of another State or a new State. In such cases, Art. 10 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, note 109 above, would be applicable. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States (With Commentaries), would also be relevant, see note 25 above. This option is explored below. 113 There appears to have been some discussion with respect to indigenous peoples in this regard. See, for example, F. Hampson, ‘Prevention of discrimination: Prevention of discrimination and protection of indigenous peoples on the human rights situation of indigenous peoples in States and other territories threatened with extinction for environmental reasons’, prepared for the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/28, 16 June 2005. A questionnaire was issued as Annex 1 in a Hampson’s paper, ‘The human rights situation of indigenous peoples in States and other territories threatened with extinction for environmental reasons: Update’, for the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the Commission on Human Rights, Working group on indigenous populations, Twenty-fourth session, 31 July – 4 August 2006, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/CRP.2, 30 June 2006. Unfortunately, however, with the dissolution of the Human Rights Commission and the Sub-Commission, work appears to have been discontinued on this issue (conversation with OHCHR representative at IASC meeting of 15 September 2008). The issue is being raised, however, by others. See, for example, R. Baird, Briefing: The impact of climate change on minorities and 15