2022 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 4(2) election of Senator Poe for failing to ‘comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution’.13 The Court sided with the SET, saying that the pre-eminent consideration in reading the Constitution is the people’s consciousness: that is, their popular, rather than technical legal understanding. The Court proceeded to explain its approach to interpreting the Constitution: On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of ‘natural-born citizens’. This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent’s Filipino parentage. On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring naturalborn status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.14 Aside from the interpretation of the Constitution, the Court’s decision in the case of David was permeated with concepts of equality and justice. The Court held that concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against foundling citizens.15 They stated: ‘To hold … that [a] private respondent is stateless is not only to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.’16 In conclusion, the Supreme Court said: Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of those who gave them life, foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly remedied by any economic relief. If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an [sic] never tolerate an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.17 COMMENTS Both Supreme Court decisions favoured Senator Poe, veering away from an interpretation of treating a constitutional ambiguity (the lack of reference to the status of foundlings) as that which would sanction discrimination. David was clear 13 14 15 16 17 David v SET (n 4). ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. 312