Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2016/02 First encountered while conducting field research for my Masters dissertation in 2012, contact has been maintained with the family of BS. Both parents and the 9 children are maktumeen.28 They have worked hard to integrate into Duhok society, with the children attending educational courses and quickly picking up the local accent. The family gained mobility to overcome Muqable’s distance from Duhok and other services through the eldest son working as a taxi driver. Later, one of the daughters became a presenter for a local TV channel. Nonetheless, years of pending asylum claims in KR-I, and being unable to return to Syria had left the family with an intermittent, yet persistent, feeling of distress. In June 2014, they were one of a number from Muqable to receive written confirmation from UNHCR that their case had been submitted to the Government of USA for resettlement consideration. By August 2015, the family was anxiously weighing up their prospects of acceptance for America against the risks of travelling illegally to Europe with the increased numbers making the journey. With no news about the former, they set out on the difficult journey to Germany, selling their possessions and spending savings in the process. Since arrival in Germany in October 2015, the family awaits their initial court hearing, having been provided temporary identification papers in the absence of residency. Following inquiry into the pending cases under consideration for resettlement to the USA, it was revealed that four families, all with stateless (maktumeen) members from Muqable camp, had been denied for further processing under TRIG (Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds). More research would here be necessary to ascertain whether the stateless status of applicants is a factor that directly contributed towards this decision. It is perhaps more likely to assume that the overly broad inadmissibility criteria, which “define any rebellion against any established government as ‘terrorist activity’” would consider association with the 2004 Kurdish uprising as cause for exclusion.29 In either case, such provisions deny protection to vulnerable stateless refugees/asylum seekers who most likely present no real risk to the USA. Meanwhile, it has been confirmed that the expanded Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement (VPR) scheme, through which the UK has pledged to accept 20,000 Syrian refugees, is focused exclusively on resettling Syrian nationals, and as such stateless persons do not fall within its scope. A representative of the Home Office Syrian Resettlement Correspondence Team acknowledged in writing that “only Syrian nationals are eligible to apply,” and that “there are no current plans to widen the Syrian Resettlement Scheme.”30 It is arguable that, if challenged, such a policy could be found to be unlawful by reason of discrimination on the basis of nationality (and lack thereof). It should be noted that through UNHCR’s registration of Syrian Kurds as refugees in KR-I, the agency has ‘known’ many of the stateless Kurds under this title for several years already. As such, more focused mapping of stateless persons within the registration process would be a good starting point for UNHCR to further operationalise its statelessness mandate in Kurdistan. Identifying statelessness in registration documents would moreover assist with verification of statelessness claims in asylum countries. The greater inclusion of stateless Syrians in resettlement programs would provide a durable solution for some of those experiencing the long-protracted problem, and avoid further protection concerns (see below) for some of the most vulnerable within the refugee community. 28 Following a lengthy legal process, the father succeeded in acquiring Turkish nationality for himself based on ancestral claims. Due to bureaucratic difficulties, he had not, however, managed to extend the nationality to his stateless children. 29 Human Rights First, ‘Addressing Barriers to the Resettlement of Vulnerable Syrian and Other Refugees’ (February 2014) <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Syria-Trig-Factsheet.pdf>. 30 Correspondence received in March 2016. 5