Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2016/02 from the benefits of citizenship provided to the ajanib.22 Approximately 5% of refugees randomly sampled in Domiz camp as part of a 2013 assessment conducted by REACH organisation were found to be maktumeen.23 Considering this finding in view of the almost quarter million total Syrian Kurdish refugee population in the Kurdistan Region indicates the likelihood of a considerable maktumeen population. Secondly, the necessity for all applicants to be present in Syria in person has left ajanib outside the country unable to benefit from the decree.24 Those based in KR-I may well be nervous that should they travel back to Syria in order to try and acquire nationality, this could affect their legal situation as refugees and present bureaucratic challenges when attempting to return to Kurdistan afterwards. This notably includes stateless members of the population of several hundred families who were forced to flee government persecution in Syria following their involvement in the 2004 Kurdish uprising (also known as Serhildana Qamishlo).25 Indeed, owing to resentment about their disenfranchisement, stateless Kurds were particularly well-represented in these demonstrations. Now, unable to return to Syria for political and protection reasons, this largely fatigued community is mostly split between two residential locations in the Duhok Governorate of KR-I, with approximately half of their number leaving for Europe over the last year.26 Case studies from each of the above mentioned locations are presented below in order to illustrate the dilemmas facing Kurdish families affected by statelessness. 3. CASE 1: Resettlement as a Durable Solution for Stateless Refugees Although, according to the law, ten years of continuous residence ordinarily makes foreigners eligible to apply for Iraqi nationality, the fact that the Syrian Kurds arriving in 2004 (like many refugees after them) entered the country illegally means that they cannot benefit from this provision.27 As such, integration in the Kurdistan Region cannot be considered to provide full resolution for their statelessness problem. The below case highlights the limited options available to stateless refugees seeking a durable solution through legal means, be it in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq or a third country. Muqable camp, located close to Sumel town along the Duhok-Zakho highway, originally hosted about 180 families from the 2004 asylum generation. With some families later being relocated (see Case 2), the approximately 90 who remained mostly upgraded and extended their tents by adding concrete walls and plastic sheeting. After more than a decade of uncertain fate, families generally feel cut off from services and left behind in the ‘forgotten camp’. A dozen in Muqable were considered to be ‘stateless families’, while others may have one or two stateless members. 22 Of 54 stateless Kurds in KR-I who participated in this research, none were able to cite a case where a maktum(a) individual had been naturalised other than where his/her ajnabi father had recently become a citizen. However, some believed that a small number of maktumeen might have been able to acquire nationality irregularly through personal connections (wasta) and/or paying a large bribe to authorities. 23 REACH/UNHCR, Domiz camp Survey Data, July 2013; Thomas McGee, ‘The Stateless Kurds of Syria: Ethnic Identity and National I.D.’ (2014) Tilburg Law Review 19, p. 175. 24 It is noted that a small number of those initially unable to access naturalization due to their inability to return to Syria have managed to acquire nationality through payment of bribes to officials. For example, Khalil Ismail and his sister (also based in KR-I) who when interviewed in 2013 (Zahra Albarazi, ‘The Stateless Syrians’, p. 19) had failed to acquire nationality with the rest of their family members in Syria, have now become citizens. 25 Jordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics, and Society (Routledge, 2009), pp. 108-32. 26 Statistics for those who have left illegally are not maintained by either UNHCR or the local authorities Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (BRHA) in Duhok. 27 See both Article 8 of the 1963 Iraqi Nationality Law, No. 46 <www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ec38.html> and Article 6 of its March 2006 amendment, No. 26, Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4019 <www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b1e364c2.pdf>. 4