712 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 105:694 initial decision to extend membership. In other words, this norm implicated redefinition only, and in situations where redefinition was unlikely to coincide with actual identity. At the same time that ongoing concern for human rights motivated efforts to establish a norm against mass denationalizations, states remained largely free to terminate the nationality of individuals against their will.118 State discretion was contested at the margins (most notably, with respect to the punitive or political use of denationalization, where statelessness might result),119 but international law put no obstacles in the way of terminating nationality when individuals participated in other polities, acquired other nationalities, enlisted in foreign militaries, or undertook other service for foreign governments. States were thus permitted to bar the acquisition of multiple citizenship—an important mechanism for maintaining the distinctiveness of national community as reinforced through nationality practice.120 Sex equality. Sex equality presented the single area in which midcentury international law edged toward constraining nationality practices. Majority state practice had provided for a woman’s nationality to follow that of her husband, both upon marriage to a foreigner (forfeiting her original nationality for that of her husband) or upon naturalization of the husband (in which case many states also provided for automatic naturalization of the wife).121 In cases where loss, but not acquisition, of nationality upon marriage was automatic, statelessness resulted; correcting this phenomenon was a central aim of those supporting the codification efforts of the 1920s.122 The 1930 Hague Convention attempted to address the problem by making automatic loss contingent on automatic acquisition.123 Beyond the statelessness concern, however, the Hague Convention confronted the nationality of women as a matter of sex equality, by providing that a husband’s naturalization should not result in the woman’s change 118 See Hailbronner, supra note 20, at 71. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92–93 (1958) (plurality opinion) (stating that “deprivation of citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its displeasure at a citizen’s conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may be”); id. at 102– 03 (citing international practice); Hudson Report on Nationality, supra note 17, at 18 (noting statelessness resulting from denationalization on ground of disloyalty); see also James A. Goldston, Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of Noncitizens, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 321, 326 –27 (2006); MANBY, CITIZENSHIP LAWS IN AFRICA, supra note 5, at 25–27 (describing cases in Africa in which denationalization has been used as a political weapon). 120 Peter J. Spiro, Dual Citizenship: A Postnational View, in DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 4, at 189, 197–98; see also Linda Bosniak, Multiple Nationality and the Postnational Transformation of Citizenship, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 979, 982– 83 (2002) (examining the effect of multiple citizenship on national ties). 121 See, e.g., BORCHARD, supra note 18, at 605, 685; CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 15–17 (1998); LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 37 (1998); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830 –1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1455–58 (1998); see also MANBY, STRUGGLES FOR CITIZENSHIP IN AFRICA, supra note 5, at 5 (noting common “gender bias” among African citizenship laws at time of independence, reflecting European practice). 122 See SCOTT, supra note 34 (lamenting sex inequality of nationality practices); Garner, supra note 26, at 551 (noting desirability of international agreement, “especially as to the effect of marriage upon the nationality of women”). 123 See Hague Convention on Nationality, supra note 16, Art. 8; see also Manley O. Hudson, The Hague Convention of 1930 and the Nationality of Women, 27 AJIL 117 (1933). The women’s suffrage movement vigorously lobbied the Hague gathering for the provision. See LEILA J. RUPP, WORLDS OF WOMEN: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 146 – 48 (1997); William Samore, Statelessness as a Consequence of the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 45 AJIL 476, 490 (1951) (“Not unheard were the various women’s organizations crusading for the ‘equality’ of the sexes.”). 119 This content downloaded from 82.196.111.31 on Thu, 07 Oct 2021 15:20:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms