Exploring Atypical Citizenship Deprivation and Spillover Effects which the ROC only governed Taiwan and the peripheral islands. From China’s perspective, Taiwan remains a legacy issue of the Chinese Civil War, despite the absence of international legal authority for its claim — as reflected in Taiwan’s omission from the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan. Over time, this has become a largely nominal sovereignty claim. In contrast, many Taiwanese argue that sovereignty should be determined by themselves, the inhabitants of Taiwan, free from external interference.15 Debates concerning Taiwan’s international status also extend to academic circles. In the domain of international law, Taiwan’s statehood is a contentious issue. While many legal scholars view Taiwan’s status from the perspective of the unresolved Chinese Civil War — seeing the PRC and ROC as rival claimants to China’s government — 16 this framework often overlooks Taiwan’s complex sovereign reality and evolving identity. This paper does not focus on Taiwan’s statehood but re-examines Taiwan’s sovereignty by asking: (1) Did China legally acquire sovereignty over Taiwan after WWII? (2) What was the legal effect of the 1952 Treaty with Japan — did it grant sovereignty to the PRC or ROC? (3) Has the ROC’s decades-long governance, albeit authoritarian, created a de facto claim to sovereignty over Taiwan? And finally, who benefits from continuing to frame Taiwan's status through the lens of the Chinese Civil War? Looking back to WWII, given Taiwan’s colonial past under Japan, should its people be entitled to self-determination? Leading scholar James Crawford argues that Taiwan is not a state because it has not unequivocally declared independence from China and lacks widespread recognition. 17 These claims touch on a core debate in international law: does recognition constitute or merely declare statehood? While the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (‘Montevideo Convention’) 18 provides indicia for the creation of statehood based on factual elements — population, territory, government and capacity for international relations — recognition remains contested. Declaratory theory holds that recognition confirms statehood but does not create it. This is supported by academic and legal writing,19 including the 1991 Badinter Commission’s opinions during the breakup of Yugoslavia.20 Even though recognition is regarded as crucially declaratory, there are still some discussions on the constitutive element of recognition in 15 16 17 18 19 20 Concerning Taiwanese people’s ideology on their identity, survey data have shown that since 2021, the prevailing opinion is that the status quo should be maintained. See Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University, ‘Taiwanese / Chinese Identity (1992/06 ~ 2025/12)’, (Dataset, 7 July 2025) <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961>, archived at <perma.cc/AW3J-P9VX> (‘Election Study Centre, “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity”’); Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University, ‘Taiwan independence vs Unification with the Mainland (1994/12~2025/06)’ (Dataset, 7 July 2025) <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963>, archived at <perma.cc/4QWD-L2D7>. Gleider I Hernández, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2022) 128; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 9th ed, 2021) 212; Crawford (n 11) 198–219. Crawford (n 11), 210–9. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, opened for signature 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934) art 1 (‘Montevideo Convention’). See, eg, Andrew Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in International Relations (Oxford Law Pro 2012) 125–9. Declaration on Yugoslavia (European Political Cooperation Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991). 105