92 justifiable. As long as DNA and GPS coordinates remained a provision in the impugned amendments, there was a possibility that they could be abused and misused and there was a risk of violating privacy rights without justification. • On discrimination, the court held that the impugned amendments were applicable to all persons resident in Kenya including foreigners. The enacted law did not differentiate between nationals and foreigners and everyone including the Nubian community and the Shona community were entitled to register. The petitioners did not establish a violation of their rights to equality and non-discrimination. The law that established NIIMS did not provide for a vetting process. It required a person to provide an identity document issued under a different piece of legislation in order to be registered under NIIMS. The requirement for the vetting of persons from border communities was introduced to section 8(1A) of the Registration of Persons Act by the Security Laws (Amendment) Act, No 19 of 2014. That provision was not challenged before the court by the petitioners. It was apparent that the issue of alleged violation of the rights of members of the Nubian community was under consideration by a court of concurrent jurisdiction. There was no evidence showing whether or not the suit was determined and what the outcome was. Therefore, the court declined to find that the petition was res judicata. • In conclusion, the court held that all the parties agreed that the use of digital data was the way of the future. The challenge was to ensure among other things, that no one was excluded from the NIIMS and the attendant services could occur due to lack of identity documents, or lack of or poor biometric data, such as fingerprints. There could be a segment of the population who ran the risk of exclusion. There was thus a need for a clear regulatory framework that addressed the possibility of exclusion in NIIMS. Such a framework would need to regulate the manner in which those without access to identity documents or with poor biometrics would be enrolled in NIIMS. While the court recognized the possibility of that exclusion, however, the court did not find that it was in itself a sufficient reason to find NIIMS unconstitutional. Petition partly allowed. A declaration was issued that the collection of DNA and GPS co-ordinates for purposes of identification was intrusive and unnecessary, and to the extent that it was not authorised and specifically anchored in empowering legislation, it was unconstitutional and a violation of article 31 of the Constitution. In so far as section 5(1)(g) and 5(1)(ha) of the Registration of Persons Act required the collection of GPS coordinates and DNA, the said subsections were in conflict with article 31 of the Constitution and were to that extent unconstitutional, null and void. The respondents were at liberty to proceed with the implementation of the National Integrated Identity Management System (NIIMS) and to process and utilize the data collected in NIIMS, only on condition that an appropriate and comprehensive regulatory framework on the implementation of NIIMS that was compliant with the applicable constitutional requirements identified in the judgment was enacted first. Each party was to bear its own costs. CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY RIGHTS CASE DIGEST