other abuses when the Ivorian government did not deliver on its promises (see below, chapter VIII). An observer in the area told Human Rights Watch: Mercenaries are recruited in Tobli [Liberia]. When they come, they don’t come along the main road, they arrive in Péhé. When they arrive in Péhé they discover that what they have been told about Gbagbo paying them is not true and they take it out on the population. They speak the same language, Gueré, as the local population, same ethnicity, but after some days and after drugs and drinking, they take it out on the local population.112 One disgruntled Liberian recruit at a checkpoint told a civilian passerby, “Oh, you’re from Abidjan, well the government brought us to defend your families, but we have not been given five francs. Gbagbo is not paying us, so we need your car and money.”113 The government-backed Liberian forces, later called the Grand West Liberation Front (Front de Liberation du Grand Ouest, FLGO) by Ivorians and the “LIMA forces” by the French military,114 were nominally led by an Ivorian sergeant named Jean Marie Touly.115 However, whether through policy or a lack of control, the Liberians became the de facto authorities in “their” areas, and they acted in collaboration with Gueré self-defense committee members who called themselves the Great West Liberation Fighters (Combatants pour Liberation de Grand-Ouest).116 There were apparently tensions between the regular armed forces, the FANCI, and the Liberian recruits, possibly due in part to the way the Liberians treated the Ivorian civilians. However another plausible explanation for the tension was that the decision to recruit Liberian rebel fighters was made by the Ministry of Defense, not the FANCI, and the FANCI lacked direct command over the Liberians.117 On this point, it must be noted that President Gbagbo himself assumed personal responsibility for the defense portfolio as of October 12, when he fired Defense Minister Moise Lida Kouassi.118 Gueré civilians from the Toulepleu area even complained to government officials in Abidjan about the way the government-allied Liberian fighters were treating civilians and were told “to be very careful, not to say that it was the mercenaries who did these things, instead to say it was the rebels.” By mid-February, however, it was clear that government-backed Liberian mercenaries, not the rebels, were in charge along the road to and in Toulepleu.119 Recruitment of Liberian refugees by government forces More than 72,000 Liberian refugees were in western Côte d’Ivoire as of September 2003. Only one official refugee camp existed—Nicla peace camp—located just a few kilometers from Guiglo town, which held approximately 4,000 refugees. The vast majority lived in a so-called refugee assistance zone (Zone d’Accueil Refugié, ZAR) that included several towns in the west, such as Danané, Man, and Guiglo. Many of the Krahn refugees, originally from bordering Grand Gedeh county in Liberia, were comfortable in the Gueré territory around Toulepleu, Guiglo and Duékoué, given their historic, cultural and linguistic cross-border links to the Gueré. Most Liberian ethnic groups were represented in the ZAR, though, including individuals who had fled abuses by the Doe regime, Taylor’s regime and Liberian rebel groups. Even before the western conflict began on November 28, Liberian refugees were vulnerable to harassment and intimidation from the Ivorian armed forces and civilian communities. After the government made statements 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Lima is the radio alphabet code for the letter “L,” so the LIMA name resulted from the fact that the combatants were Liberian. 115 Tidiane Dioh, “Dialogue de sourds,” Jeune Afrique l’Intelligent, February 2-8, 2003, p. 67. 116 Human Rights Watch interview, Abidjan, March 27, 2003. 117 Human Rights Watch interview, Abidjan, March 28, 2003. 118 Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, “Ivory Coast Rebels Seize Key Cocoa Town As Mediation Hopes Increase,” October 14, 2002 at www.allAfrica.com. 119 Human Rights Watch interview, Abidjan, March 26, 2003. Human Rights Watch 33 August 2003, Vol. 15, No. 14 (A)

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