division has persisted among their descendants to this day. Those who attended the 1962 census but failed to satisfy the authorities that they were resident in Syria prior to 1945 were considered ‘ajanib’ (literally meaning ‘foreigners’).57 This population faced restrictions in terms of access to public services and limited rights of ownership, inheritance and education, amongst others. A second group, the ‘maktumeen’ (roughly translated as the ‘concealed’ ones) were those who did not participate in the census. They have even fewer rights than the ajanib and are unable to legally travel within Syria without special security permission.58 37. Following decades of mobilisation among Kurdish activists and human rights actors calling for these individuals to be able to access Syrian citizenship, Decree No 49 of April 2011 was a welcome move to permit the granting of citizenship to some stateless Kurds. However, the Decree made no acknowledgement of the historical injustices, suffering, and rights deprivations experienced across generations. It was seen as granting citizenship as a concession rather than in recognition of the rights and entitlements of those naturalized. Indeed, official Syrian government discourse has been silent on this issue. Additionally, in terms of inclusion within society, many ethnic Kurds continue to resent the fact that Syrian citizens are officially defined as ‘Syrian Arab citizens’. Civil society activists have raised the question of dropping the term ‘Arab’ from the citizenship and the name of the state in order to more accurately reflect Syria’s ethnically diverse demography.59 38. Moreover, the naturalization process only applies to ajanib in Syria, thereby excluding the maktumeen, and also those ajanib who have fled Syria. 60 Further, stringent requirements mean that many ajanib even within Syria cannot benefit – such as documentation requirements, obligation to register in a specific district and the need to process the request with all family members present.61 The Syrian government has not published updated statistics on the number of formerly stateless Kurds who have accessed citizenship after the 2011 Decree was passed. UNHCR reporting from 2016 states that by mid-2013, approximately 104,000 Kurds had benefitted from the naturalization process.62 39. Education remains a pressing concern for many (formerly) stateless Kurds of Syria, both in terms of compensating for missed opportunities, and obtaining accreditation for studies undertaken. Moreover, even stateless Kurds who have been naturalized face 57 Thomas McGee, “The Stateless Kurds of Syria: Ethnic Identity and National I.D.”, Tilburg Law Review, Vol. 19, Issue 1-2, pages 171 – 181. 58 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and European Network on Statelessness, “From Syria to Europe: Experiences of Stateless Kurds and Palestinian Refugees from Syria Seeking Protection in Europe,” January 2019, available at: http://www.institutesi.org/from_Syria_to_Europe.pdf. 59Hamed Mohammad Saffour, Dr. Rim Turkmani & Mazen Gharibah, “An Analysis of Commonalities and Divergences of Syrian Constitutional Papers Since 2011,” Conflict Research Programme, 26 October 2019, available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102253/5/Turkmani_an_analysis_of_commonalities_and_divergences_published_Englis h.pdf. 60 Thomas McGee, “Statelessness Displaced: Update on Syria’s Stateless Kurds,” Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2016/02, 2016, available at: https://files.institutesi.org/WP2016_02.pdf. 61 European Network on Statelessness and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, “Statelessness in Syria,” August 2019, available at: https://statelessjourneys.org/wp-content/uploads/StatelessJourneys-Syria-August2019.pdf. 62 UNHCR, “Global Report 2012 – Syrian Arab Republic,” 19 June 2013, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d63cb.html. 12