|| Prolonged conflict and insecurity in areas of
origin are made worse by a lack of state presence, and levels of crime and violence are also
high in areas of refuge. The latter not only
triggers secondary displacement, but also
adds to IDPs’ unaddressed trauma and other
mental health issues.
|| Many IDPs, particularly those from rural backgrounds or indigenous and African-Colombian communities, do not have the skills to
compete in urban labour markets. Nor do
young IDPs have enough access to higher
education, which is essential for moving out
of poverty in Colombia.
|| Land restitution in areas of origin is difficult,
tenure is insecure, and the illegal status of the
settlements where many IDPs live prevents
municipal authorities from providing services
and infrastructure.
|| Local authorities’ capacity is weak and the
central government does not allocate them
enough funds, in part because its calculations
are based on outdated census data.
|| IDPs are not integrated into regular state
action, and coordination between line ministries is weak.
|| Donors have allocated only limited resources
for durable solutions, because funding prioritises other aspects of the peace agreement,
such as disaster risk reduction and transitional
justice.71
Colombia has an advanced legal framework for
IDPs, and since 2004 the Constitutional Court has
been demanding that the government guarantee
victims’ rights. This led to the introduction of the
2011 victims’ law, a pioneering piece of legislation that entitles IDPs and other victims of the
conflict to reparations.72 It also led to the creation of a dedicated government victim’s unit and
a national plan for assistance and reparation.73
The 2011 law envisages addressing IDPs’ needs
on three levels. First, they receive immediate
humanitarian assistance, vital given that 4.9
million people in Colombia are considered to be
in need of it. This falls under the responsibility of
the victim’s unit, with support from international
organisations. The second level aims to overcome
socioeconomic vulnerability, and focuses on
seven components: food; education; identification documents; family reunion; health, including
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psychosocial attention; housing; and livelihoods,
including vocational training and occupational
orientation. The third level is reparation, involving
compensation, rehabilitation, restitution and
guarantees of non-repetition.
In less than four years, the programme has
compensated more than 500,000 victims, but
this represents less than 10 per cent of the total
number who are supposed to receive compensation by 2021.74 According to an evaluation by
Harvard University’s Carr Center, to do so would
require a sevenfold increase in the victims’ unit
capacity.75
In support of the government, UNHCR and UNDP
have also been running a “transitional solutions
initiative” in 17 communities to help IDPs become
less dependent on the authorities and more selfreliant.76 The programme aims to improve quality
of life, strengthen organisations and institutions,
and protect victims and their rights.
Most of the victims of Colombia’s conflict are
IDPs. The fact that the government has included
them among those entitled to compensation is
a commendable and significant first step. The
commitment, however, creates unprecedented
challenges given that more than 12 per cent of
the country’s population is eligible for reparation.
Given that implementing the many requirements
of the peace agreement with FARC will require
significant attention and resources, it will be vital
to keep the country’s seven million IDPs at the top
of the government’s agenda and to help them
overcome the obstacles they still face in achieving
durable solutions. This also means ensuring that
the humanitarian and development sectors, local
authorities and private enterprises work collectively to end aid dependency and promote IDPs’
self-reliance.77