b. Creation of new states For countries that have been divided into two internationally recognised states, such as Sudan and South Sudan, we consider all people displaced within each of the new entities as IDPs, and we produce separate estimates for each one. People who fled within the previously undivided state and who crossed the border that delineates the new entities are no longer counted as IDPs. Similarly, we no longer count people who fled from Timor-Leste to West Timor when the former was established in 1999. Their number has been subtracted from our estimate for Indonesia. c. Unilateral secession For regional entities such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have unilaterally seceded outside an internationally supported process, we do not count IDPs within them separately from those in the state they have seceded from, in this case Georgia. In cases such as Kosovo, however, where a majority of UN member states have established diplomatic relations with a seceding entity, we do produce estimates for IDPs who have fled within it. We no longer count people as IDPs if they have crossed what has become a de facto international border and find themselves in different entity from the one in which they were originally displaced. As such, our estimate for Kosovo refers only to people who have fled within the territory itself. Given that the Serbian government reports all IDPs in the country as having come from Kosovo, Serbia is not included in the 2017 GRID. These decisions not to continue counting people we previously considered IDPs in no way implies that they no longer have vulnerabilities related to their displacement. tarian agencies operate, and the objectives of their response and motives for collecting displacement data. Humanitarian agencies often have difficulty in accessing to conflict zones, which can lead to significant information gaps. Our sources tend to monitor and report on displacement more comprehensively in areas where IDPs are most visible, such as in camps. In most cases, however, agencies fail to record the geographical dynamics of IDPs’ movements when registering them. In other cases, such as Myanmar and Syria, they collect data in regions that overlap, often using different methodologies. Data gatherers are very likely to overlook IDPs living in more dispersed settings. These include people who move to urban areas where they blend in with local inhabitants; those who flee to remote areas, such as the bush in CAR or the forests of Côte d’Ivoire; and those who are hosted by other families or relatives, as in the Philippines. They end up unreported, and the scope and nature of such displacement cannot be quantified and assessed. Their number and fate remain unknown. Temporal scope and frequency of reporting The 2017 GRID dataset reports separately on the total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016, and the number of new displacements during the year. The former reflects the number of people still displaced at the end of the year; the latter includes repeated displacement or other movements of people who fled or returned home during the course of the year. Geographical scope and coverage The figures reported are static, but IDPs’ movements are not. For this reason, we aim to improve our methodology and increase not only its geographical, but also its temporal coverage. We plan to produce displacement figures more frequently in order to capture the fluidity and complexity of IDPs’ movements. We aim to capture the full geographical scope of displacement and strive to monitor and report on all situations across the whole of each country we cover. In many, such as Burundi, the DRC, Mozambique, Syria and Turkey, however, data sources do not cover all of the regions where displacement took place. As a result, our figures only reflect geographical areas where humani- To do so, we will soon begin piloting a hybrid monitoring methodology that combines eventbased and country-based monitoring of displacement situations as they evolve over time (see part 3). The idea is to identify events in near-real time, manually verify those we deem to have led to people fleeing and then engage partners in the field to collect time-series data. In some cases METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX 105